performance models now gives us a clearer chance to use speech error evidence in refining the balance of power
among components in the competence theory.
Next consider tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) states. In a TOT state, speakers have selected a lexical conceptual structure
and can accept or reject proffered words as what theyhad in mind. They just can't locate the phonology (“No, it's not
THAT, butdamnedifIcanrememberwhatitis!”).As readers willsurelyrecognizefro mpersonalexperience, one may
beabletorecallpartofthephonologyor prosody(“Itsounds likeda-DUM-dum”);Caramazza and Miozzo(1997)show
that in, say, Italian, one may also recall the grammatical gender (“It's LAsomething-or-other”), more or less
independently of the phonology.^108
The proble minTOTstatescouldconceivablyfallat three differentpoints inlexicalaccess. First, itcouldbea proble m
of activation:the lexical conceptual structure activated by the intended thought could fail to pass sufficient activation
on to the corresponding phonology and/or syntax. Second, it could be a proble mof binding: the phonology could be
appropriatelyactivated in longter m me mory but failtofind its way intoworkingmemory. Third, itcouldbe a problem
of integration: the phonology could get onto the“blackboard”but fail to be integrated into the utterance. I a min no
position to decide among these. Perhaps a correct solution or at least further experimentation may emerge from a
closer consideration of the data (including fro mano mia and conduction aphasia) in light of the more fully articulated
model of lexical access and modularity developed here.
7.4.5 Syntactic priming
Bock and Loebell (1990) give experimental evidence that not only do words prime other words, but syntactic
structures prime other syntactic structures. Bock (1995: 199) explains:
For example, a speaker who employs a double-object dative in one utterance (perhaps,“The governess made the princess a pot of tea”)is
subsequentlymore likelytouse a double-objectdativethan a prepositional dative,evenina completelyunrelated utterance (so,“Thewomanis
showing a man a dress”becomes relatively more likely than“The woman is showing a dress to a man”).
This raises a proble mfor the usual approach to syntactic structure (p. 200):
[S]ince structural repetition does not appear to depend on the repetitionof particular words or thematic roles or features of word meaning...,
its explanation rests on the
IMPLICATIONS FOR PROCESSING 217
(^108) They use this independence to argue that lexical phonology and syntax are independently activatedby lexical semantics, with which I concur. But theygo on to argue for a
model of lexical organization that is indefensible for reasons discussed in note 8 above.