Chapter 10 Reference and Truth

10.1 Introduction

A crucial part of semantic theory is to explain how reference and truth value are attached to linguistic expressions.
Common sense tellsus that linguistic expressions say things about the world.WhenI sayRussell was a great philosopher,I
a mreferring to Russell, a real person in the real world. When I point at so mething and sayThat is a chicken, my deictic
termthatis intended to refer to the thing in the world that I' mpointing at. Sentences intuitively have truth values by
virtue of how they relate to the world.Snow is greenis false because snow isn't green.My name is Russellis true if uttered
by somebody named Russell (e.g. Rosalind Russell, Kevin Russell, Russell Stover), and false if uttered by anyone else.
It's raining outsideis true if at the moment of utterance there is rain coming down outside the enclosure in which the
speaker is located and false otherwise.

The predominant traditions in Anglo-American semantics and philosophy of language take for granted this common-
sense position. They therefore consider it the task of semantic/pragmatic theory to explain how linguistic expressions
say things about the world and have truth values based on their relation to the world.

Thenexttwosectionswillshowthata mentalistictheoryof language provesnotsoeasytoreconcilewiththiscommon
sense position on reference and truth. After exploring a couple of not very promising alternatives, I will conclude that
it is necessary to thoroughly psychologize not just language, but also“the world.”The intent behind this perhaps mysterious
statement will become clearer as we go along, and many perils must be avoided in order to make sense of it.

I must make clear from the outset that my goal is not to show that the common-sense view of reference and truth is
false and should be rejected out of hand. Consider by analogy the notion ofsunset. The scientific view of sunsets does
notsaythatthesundoesn'treallygodownand thereforethatthereisnosuchthing as a sunset. Rather,itsaysthat(a)a
less intuitive account in terms of