concatenating its two taxonomic features within the formal quale, as in (30). He calls this concatenation adot object.
(30) [PHYSICAL OBJECT•INFORMATION]Inturn,eachoftheseaspectsgivesrisetofurtherqualiastructure. Thephysicalobject's constitutivequaledescribes the
physical makeup of a book; the telic quale includes how books are sold and stored; the agentive quale includes how
books are printedand bound. The information's constitutivequaledescribes whattheinformation depicts—ifa novel,
under a modality designating the information as fiction. The telic quale says the information is intended for
amusement; the agentive quale says that the information is made up by a novelist. In addition, there are two crucial
links between the dual qualia structures. The constitutivequalia are linked by the fact that the physical objectbears the
information. The telic qualia are linked by the fact that people read books, a physical activity whose outcome is the
reader's assimilation of the information borne by the physical object. The upshot of this innovation is that qualia
structure goes evenfurther beyond a list of features. Dot objects have a richlyinterconnected pair of qualia structures.
And there can be dot-object activities. We have already come across one:readingconsists of two“dotted”actions: the
action of visually scanning a writing-bearing (dot-)object, combined with the action of assimilating the information
therein. Another prominent case is speech acts, which involve both making a noise and transmitting information of
which the noise is the vehicle.
Perhaps the most important dot-object in the conceptual system is the concept of a person. On one hand, a person is
conceptualizedas a physicalobject, and allthepredicates pertainingtophysicalobjects canbeappliedtopeople:spatial
extent and location, construction out of parts, the possibility of motion and of contact with other physical objects,
susceptibilityto gravity, and so on. On theotherhand, a person is conceptualized simultaneously as a mind or a selfor
(dare we say it) a soul. This aspect isnotphysical, and if it has parts, they are things like memory and will rather than
arms and legs. The predicates pertaining to the mind are mental and social predicates, having to do with volition,
memory, understanding, social roles, rights and obligations.
These twocomponents are universallyconceptualized as separable.In particular, every culture is concerned with what
happens to the mind/self/soul after death, when the body reverts to a mere physicalobject. All cultures I've ever read
of have a notion of spirits or ghosts—minds/selves/soulslacking a body, but capable of acts of willand memory, and
of entering into social relationships with each other and with ordinary people. The notion of reincarnation is
widespread—minds/selves/souls coming to occupy a different body. On a more