comparisons would demonstrate that convertible securities as a
whole have relatively poor quality as senior issues and also are tied
to common stocks that do worse than the general market except
during a speculative upsurge. These observations do not apply to
all convertible issues, of course. In the 1968 and 1969 particularly, a
fair number of strong companies used convertible issues to combat
the inordinately high interest rates for even first-quality bonds. But
it is noteworthy that in our 20-stock sample of convertible pre-
ferreds only one showed an advance and 14 suffered bad declines.*
406 The Intelligent Investor
TABLE 16-2 Price Record of Preferred Stocks, Common Stocks,
and Warrants, December 1970 versus December 1968
(Based on Random Samples of 20 Issues Each)
Straight Preferred Stocks
Rated A
or Better
Rated
Below A
Convertible
Preferred
Stocks
Listed
Warrants
Listed
Common
Stocks
Advances 2 0 1 2 1
Declines:
0–10% 3 3 3 4 0
10–20% 14 10 2 1 0
20–40% 1 5 5 6 1
40% or more 0 0 9 7 18
Average declines 10% 17% 29% 33% 65%
(Standard & Poor’s composite index of 500 common stocks declined 11.3%.)
* Recent structural changes in the convertible market have negated some of
these criticisms. Convertible preferred stock, which made up roughly half
the total convertible market in Graham’s day, now accounts for only an
eighth of the market. Maturities are shorter, making convertible bonds less
volatile, and many now carry “call protection,” or assurances against early
redemption. And more than half of all convertibles are now investment
grade, a significant improvement in credit quality from Graham’s time. Thus,
in 2002, the Merrill Lynch All U.S. Convertible Index lost 8.6%—versus the
22.1% loss of the S & P 500-stock index and the 31.3% decline in the
NASDAQ Composite stock index.