PLeading for PLura Lityit is easy to ‘translate’ this passage into a text about ‘research’: i mean making chemical
experiments, sending out questionnaires, bird watching, interpreting poems, digging for
archaeological remains, solving problems in formal logic, gathering astronomical data
by way of radio telescopes, and so on. What is common to them all? don’t say: ‘There
must be something common, or these actions would not be called “research”’ – but look
and see whether there is anything common to all.
let us now look at art:^13 i mean sonnets, ready- mades, operas, novels, paintings,
films, pantomimes, and so on. What is common to them all? don’t say: ‘There must
be something common, or these products would not be called “art”’ – but look and see
whether there is anything common to all.
now, let us turn to science: i mean statistics, history, philosophy, neurology, semiotics,
agricultural science, dramaturgy, political science, glaciology, and so on. What is common
to them all? don’t say: ‘There must be something common, or these academic fields
would not be called “sciences”’ – but look and see whether there is anything common to
all...
But how do we give the same name to various groups of phenomena, counting
them in the same category, if they do not have anything in common? Wittgenstein
seeks a solution to this problem by taking his point of departure in the last phrase
of my quotation: ‘similarities crop up and disappear’; the quote continues ‘We see a
complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss- crossing: sometimes overall
similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.’ and in the next paragraph Wittgenstein
gives this pattern a name:
i can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than
‘family resemblances’; for the various resemblances between members of a
family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and
criss- cross in the same way. – and i shall say: ‘games’ form a family.
(Wittgenstein 1953: §67)We might add that this is the same for various kinds of research and research
methods, the different arts and the different sciences.
Wittgenstein has been much criticised for his use of the catchy term ‘family
resemblance’, because it does not seem evident that his observation about the criss-
cross of physical and psychological traits among members of a family is at all true, not
even among the genetically related. But the point is not how much members of families
are alike, but whether his point about our use of words and concepts is both correct and
illuminating. and that he is not dependent on the specific metaphor of the family, can
be gathered from his just as metaphorical remark about how the concept of number
develops:
and we extend our concept of number as in spinning a thread we twist fibre
on fibre. and the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some
one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many
fibres.
(Wittgenstein 1953: §67)