The Economist March 12th 2022 31
AsiaIndia,RussiaandtheWestAbstemious to a fault
I
ndian politicianslove to remind peo
ple that their country is the world’s big
gest democracy. They are also extremely
prickly about its borders. Yet India has
failed to condemn President Vladimir Pu
tin’s attempt to wipe off the map another
independent democracy, Ukraine. In the
unSecurity Council, the General Assembly
and the Human Rights Council, India con
spicuously abstained from resolutions de
ploring Russia’s invasion of its neighbour.
That perplexes some observers in Western
capitals. The government of Narendra Mo
di, the prime minister, has done much to
improve ties with America and Europe in
recent years. But when asked to choose
sides, India sits on the fence. To some, it
seems that Mr Modi favours Mr Putin.
Not so, say Indian policymakers, point
ing to official statements that lament the
violence, express support for sovereignty
and territorial integrity, and call for diplo
macy to be given a chance. Moreover, they
say, the abstentions should be seen in the
context of India’s long tradition of being
beholden to no superpower. Yet many ofthe countries India once claimed to lead in
a coldwar era “nonaligned movement”
have joined in the condemnation of Mr Pu
tin’s actions.
India’s abstentions are shaped by past
habits and current priorities. Start with the
past: its ties with the Soviet Union ran
deep, for all its protestations of nonalign
ment. Russia provided food aid and eco
nomic subsidies, and Indian bookstalls
were crowded with the translated works of
Lenin and approved Russian novelists. The
kgbran around Delhi, the capital, with
bags of cash for influential people.
Today India counts on the support of
Russia, with which it has a “special and
privileged strategic partnership”, for itsclaims over Kashmir—one reason for nev
er crossing it at the un. Also influential is
India’s assessment of its defence needs, re
lying on Moscow, as it did in the cold war,
for weapons. Half its arms imports come
from Russia, including bigticket items
such as submarines, t90 battle tanks,
Su30 fighter aircraft and a surfacetoair
missile system known as the s400.
More importantly, 70% of India’s exist
ing arsenal is Russianmade. That makes it
difficult to wind down business. Even if In
dia were to stop importing new materiel
today, it would still need ammunition,
spare parts and technical support for what
it already has. Russia is also helping India
make more of its own weaponry,points out
Anit Mukherjee of the S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies in Singa
pore. The search for “strategic autonomy”
is a mantra in Delhi.
Politicians in America and Europe have
lambasted India for abstaining at the un
and buying weapons from Moscow. On
March 3rd a State Department official, Do
nald Lu, told lawmakers that President Joe
Biden’s administration was considering
whether to punish India for its reliance on
Russian arms and equipment. Axios, a
news website, reported that a leaked cable
instructed American diplomats to remind
their counterparts that India’s stance
“places you in Russia’s camp, the aggressor
in this conflict”. The administration later
said the cable was a draft that had been dis
seminated in error.D ELHI
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