The Economist March 12th 2022 57
Finance & economics
Commoditiesandsanctions
Barrelled over
I
n 1866 nikolai nekrasov, a Russian au
thor, started publishing “Who is happy in
Russia”, a fourpart poem describing how
the abolition of serfdom, enacted a few
years before, had failed to enrich most
peasants. “The chain has been broken,” its
first chapter concludes, and the recoiling
ends have hit both sides at once.
A century and a half later his verses are
a parable for the ostracism of Russia—and
its likely fallout. Crushing the world’s 11th
largest economy, comparable in size to
Australia, should not necessarily cause
global mayhem. But since Nekrasov’s time,
and further still since the Soviet Union col
lapsed, the chain of dependence linking
Russia to the world economy has strength
ened and grown more complex. Russia
ranks number one, two and three, respec
tively, among the world’s exporters of nat
ural gas, oil and coal. Europe gets the bulk
of its energy from its eastern neighbour.
Russia also accounts for half of America’s
uranium imports. It supplies a tenth of the
world’s aluminium and copper, and a fifth
of batterygrade nickel. Its dominance in
precious metals such as palladium, key in
the automotive and electronics industries,
is even greater. It is also a crucial source of
wheat and fertilisers (see next story).
So far its exports of raw materials have
been spared the kind of comprehensive
bans the West has imposed on other sec
tors. America announced an embargo on
Russian oil on March 8th, but it buys little
of the stuff; Britain will phase out purchas
es this year. However, growing signs the
West could go further have shocked com
modities markets. After America’s secre
tary of state, Antony Blinken, said on
March 6th that it was speaking to allies
about a common ban, Brent crude soared
to $139 a barrel, double the price of Decem
ber 1st—though by March 10th it had fallen
back to $113. Price swings were violent in
gas too: on March 8th contracts linked to
the European wholesale gas price surged
by a third to €285 ($316) per mwh, 18 times
their level a year ago, as Russia threatened
to retaliate. On the same day, the London
Metal Exchange (lme) suspended nickel
trading for only the second time in its 145
year history after the metal hit double its
previous record price. This week other
metals hit or neared alltime highs.
A shock of such depth and breadth is
without precedent. A corecommodity in
dex compiled by Thomson Reuters has ris
en by more than in any period since 1973,
on a threemonth basis. In the week end
ing March 4th it showed its biggest in
crease since at least 1956. Beyond trading
floors, hysteria is not yet visible. The calm
is unlikely to last. “Right now prices are
prints on a screen. In four weeks they be
come reality,” says a trader. If tensions rise
further, energy and metals may have to be
rationed. Private firms and personal lives
will have to painfully adjust. The rich
world would sputter. Poor countries could
go bust. In the end Russia may buckle—but
not before the broken chain snaps back at
the rest of the world with huge violence.
Commodity markets are panicking for
two reasons. First, many were tight even
before the war, owing to strong demand. A
robust postlockdown economic recovery
had fuelled appetite for energy and metals,
dragging stocks down to recordlow levels.
In the first article of a special section on the fallout from the war in Ukraine,
we examine whether the world can cope without Russia’s huge commodity stash
→Alsointhissection
59 Wheatgoeswild
60 Russia’sChinesebackchannel
61 Credit-marketcalm
62 HowIransurvivedsanctions
63 Hotspotsofcrony-capitalism
66 Free exchange: When oil shocks