The Economist March 12th 2022 Finance & economics 59
deficits.Analysis by The Economist sug
geststhat,allelsebeingequal,oilat$150a
barrelfora yearwouldcausethecurrent
accountbalancesof 37 oilimporterstosink
byanaverage2.3percentagepoints.That
would clobber countries already under
stress,suchasPakistanandTurkey (see
chart2 onpreviouspage).Chinawouldsee
a percentagepointknockedoffitscurrent
accountsurplus.Evenbigcommodityex
porters like Chile could suffer, because
metalshavenotappreciatedasmuch.Oil
exportingcountries wouldgainbut still
faceissues,suchascurrencyappreciation
thatweighedonnonenergyexports.
Highpricesarelikelytooutlastthelift
ingofsanctions.Russia,seenasa disrepu
tableandriskytradingpartner,willremain
marginalised,saysTomPriceofLiberum,a
bank. Asits capitalmarkets andexport
proceeds struggleto recover,investment
in commodity production will dwindle.
Togetherwithalossofskillsandassets,
thiswillcausecapacitytoshrink.Beyond
2022 higherinterestratesandslowerglo
balgrowthmaypromptthemarketfinally
tocool—atanexorbitantcost.In 1876 Nek
rasovstartedwritingthefinalandjolliest
partofhispoem,callingit “Thefeastforall
theworld”.Thehappyendingnevercame:
thechapterremainsunfinished. n
Agriculturalcommodities
Grainstorm
I
n october 1914 the Ottoman Empire,
having just joined the first world war,
blockaded the Dardanelles Strait, the only
route for Russian wheat to travel to Britain
and France. The world had entered the con
flict with wheat stocks 12% above the five
year average, but losing over 20% of the
global traded supply of the crop overnight
set food markets ablaze. Having risen by a
fifth since June 1914, wheat prices in Chica
go, the international benchmark, leapt by
another 45% over the following quarter.
Today Russia and Ukraine, respectively
the largest and fifthlargest wheat export
ers, together account for 29% of interna
tional annual sales. And after several poor
harvests, frantic buying during the pan
demic and supplychain issues since, glo
bal stocks are 31% below the fiveyear aver
age. But this time it is the threat of embar
goes from the West that has lit a bonfire—
and the flames are higher than even during
the Great War. Wheat prices, which were
already 49% above their 201721 average in
midFebruary, have risen by another 30%
since the invasion of Ukraine started on
February 24th. Uncertainty is skyhigh: in
dicators of price volatility compiled by if-
pri, a thinktank, are flashing bright red.
Rabobank, a Dutch lender, reckons
wheat prices could climb by another third.
But the damage to global food supply will
extend far beyond the grain—and last lon
ger than the war itself. Together Russia and
Ukraine export 12% of the calories traded
worldwide. They rank among the top five
exporters of many oilseeds and cereals,
from barley and corn to sunflowers, con
sumed by humans and animals. Russia
alone is the biggest supplier of key ingredi
ents in the making of fertilisers, without
which crops falter or lose nutrients.
In February, even before the war start
ed, a foodprice index compiled by the un
Food and Agriculture Organisation had
reached an alltime high; the number of
people deemed foodinsecure, at 800m,
was at its highest for a decade. Many more
could soon join them. Higher food prices
will also stoke inflation, adding to the
price pressures generated by dearer energy.
The fallout from the war will be felt in
three ways: disruption to current grain
shipments, low or inaccessible future har
vests in Ukraine and Russia, and withered
production in other parts of the world.
Start with shipments. In normal times
wheat and barley crops are harvested in the
summer and exported in the autumn; by
February most ships are gone. But these are
not normal times: with global stocks low,
big importers of Black Sea wheat, chiefly in
the Middle East and North Africa, are anx
ious to secure more supplies. They are not
getting them. Ukrainian ports are shut.
Some have been bombed. Inland routes,
via the north of Ukraine and onwards
through Poland, are too great a diversion to
be practical. Vessels trying to pick up grain
from Russia have been hit by missiles in
the Black Sea. Most cannot get insurance.
Alternative sources are unaffordable.
Last week Egypt cancelled its second wheat
tender in a row after receiving only three
offers—at a stomachchurning price—
down from 20 a fortnight before. More
concerning still, exports of corn, of which
Ukraine accounts for nearly 13% of global
exports, usually take place through the
spring until the early summer. Much of it is
normally shipped from the port of Odessa,
which is bracing for a Russian assault.
Future crops are an even bigger worry.
In Ukraine the war may result in lower
yields and area planted. Winter crops such
as wheat and barley, which are sown in Oc
tober, could be smaller because of a lack of
fertiliser and pesticides. Spring crops such
as corn and sunflowers, the planting of
which would normally start imminently,
may not get sown at all. Leonid Tsentilo,
whose farm in central Ukraine grows 7,000
tonnes of wheat a year, says local prices for
diesel and plantprotection products have
risen by 50% in two weeks. Some of his
workers have been shipped off to war.
In Russia the risk is not curtailed pro
duction but blockaded exports. Although
food sales are not yet subject to sanctions,
Western banks are reluctant to lend to trad
ers. Fear of being fined by governments in
the West or shamed by its press is keeping
KYIV
War in Ukraine will cripple global food markets
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