For Oakeshott ( 1962 , 126 – 7 ) a tradition is a ‘‘Xow of sympathy’’ and in any political
activity we ‘‘sail a boundless and bottomless sea’’ and ‘‘the enterprise is to keep
aXoat on an even keel.’’ This is a conservative idealism that treats tradition as
a resource to which one should typically feel allegiance (cf. Taylor 1985 ;
Skinner 1969 ).
For Johnson ( 1989 , 131 , 112 ), political institutions ‘‘express... ideas about
political authority... and embody a continuing approach to resolving the issues
which arise in the relations between citizen and government.’’ Institutions are also
normative, ‘‘serv[ing] as means of communicating and transmitting values.’’ They
are the expression of human purpose, so political institutions necessarily contain a
normative element (Johnson 1975 , 276 – 7 ). The task of ‘‘political science,’’ a term
Johnson would abhor, is to study institutions using ‘‘the methods of historical
research... to establish what is particular and speciWc rather than to formulate
statements of regularity or generalisations claiming to apply universally.’’ History is
‘‘the source of experience’’ while philosophy is ‘‘the means of its critical appraisal’’
(Johnson 1989 , 122 – 3 ). Johnson’s ( 1977 , 30 ; emphasis in original) analysis of the
British constitution is grounded in the ‘‘extraordinary and basically unbroken
continuity of conventional political habits.’’ The British ‘‘constitutionis these
political habits and little else’’ and the core notion is ‘‘the complete dominance’’
of the idea of parliamentary government. Johnson ( 2004 ) applies this idea of the
customary constitution of practices ‘‘mysteriously handed down as the intimations
of a tradition’’ and ‘‘inarticulate major premises’’ (the reference is, of course, to
Oakeshott) to New Labour’s constitutional reforms; for example, devolution. His
detailed commentary is of little concern here. Of relevance is his ‘‘bias’’ towards
‘‘the customary constitution’’ because of its ‘‘remarkable record of adaptation to
changing circumstances and challenges’’ (Johnson 2004 , 5 ). However, a customary
constitution depends on support from a society that is sympathetic to ‘‘habit,
convention and tradition.’’ Johnson fears there is a ‘‘crumbling respect for trad-
ition’’ and ponders whether the current reforms move ‘‘beyond custom
and practice,’’ and ‘‘piecemeal adaptation may have its limits.’’ The customary
supports of the constitution may well have been ‘‘eroded beyond recall.’’ Johnson
( 2004 ) ends on this interrogatory note.
The notion of institutions as embedded ideas and practices is central to
Johnson’s analysis. It also lies at the heart of the Islamic study of political institutions.
Al-Buraey ( 1985 , ch. 6 ) identiWes a distinctive Islamic approach to the institutions
and processes of administrative development. Its distinctive features include: its
emphasis on Islamic values and ethical standards; prayers in an Islamic organiza-
tion—salahWve times a day is a duty because it is as necessary to feed the soul as to
feed the body; bureaucracies that represent the groups they serve; andshuraor the
process of continuous dialogue between ruler and ruled until a consensus emerges.
Also, as Omid ( 1994 , 4 ) argues, Islam can produce two contrasting views of the role of
the state. The state exists ‘‘only to protect and apply the laws as stated by God.’’ The
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