policy instruments such as intergovernmental grants,Wscal decentralization, and
revenue sharing (Oates 1999 ). Models are built with respect to the appropriate
assignment of tasks andWnances, in the case of EU tax harmonization and local
governmentWnance in the UK (James 2004 ) or about the equalizing performance
of central grants to communes in France (Gilbert and Guengant 2002 ).
Political dynamics should test counter-intuitive hypotheses. Increasing central-
ization does not mechanically imply less autonomy and inXuence for the localities;
quite the reverse. Classic political science approaches tend to assume that political
variables explain most of the variance about territorial politics. Are polities really
in control? To what extent should one consider political dynamics not as causes
but as intended or unintended consequences of subnational aVairs and their
government?
8 State Theories: Global Contexts
Matter
.........................................................................................................................................................................................
Most state theories share a paradox. They state that macro-level factors determine
patterns of central–local relations. Broader political, economic, and social contexts
give birth to an unending series of crises and changes preventing territorial public
aVairs from reaching a level of stability. Center–local relationships are considered
as dependent variables, as social constructs. Independent or exogenous variables
explain why and how formal as well as informal links and norms emerge and
evolve.
Early social class conXict approaches assumed that local governments are mere
passive servants of national and international capitalism (Castells and Godard 1974 ;
Dunleavy 1980 ). Critical scholars argued that territorial politics does not really
matter as a relevant knowledge domain and action arena. In the 1980 s two less
abrupt functional explanations were oVered. The dual state thesis argues that the
state keeps control of social investment policies at the national level. It leaves the
management of social consumption policies in the hands of subnational author-
ities. Local democracy provides remedies to help the poorWghting the failures of
markets, while national politics allocates, in a closed corporate manner, support,
goods, and services to the proWtable private sector (Saunders 1982 ). Social
consumption being necessarily subordinate to social investment, local levels are
therefore dominated by central levels.
288 jean-claude thoenig