political science

legislature, and the legislature selects (delegates to) the executive. The political
process of the presidential system is depicted with two delegation links from the
electorate to both the legislature and the popularly elected executive; additionally,

there is a transactional relationship between the executive and the legislature, which
are located at the same level, rather than with one subordinate to the other. They

then engage in a horizontally depicted process of interbranch transactions.
As has been noted frequently in the literature, at least since Bagehot and right up

to recent works (Moe and Caldwell 1994 ; Palmer 1995 ), the Westminster democracy
of Great Britain and the presidential system of the United States oVer the closest

approximations to these ideal types. The parliamentary system with a single-party
majority government generates a highly hierarchical form of democratic delega-

tion. By contrast, the public bargaining and institutionalized conXict between the
American presidency and Congress represent a virtually ideal manifestation of
transactional executive–legislative relations.

Pure as examples the British and American models may be, neither system is
typical of experience in the rest of the world. Most parliamentary systems do not

have single-party majorities like Britain. In the absence of such majorities, the key
features of politics in the system are transactional, because the assembly to

which the executive is accountable is not itself controlled by a single hierarchical
organization. Rather, authority is shared by two or more parties. Similarly, most

presidential systems feature less prominently the interbranch policy transactions
that so typify the US. The reasons lie in an often unstated condition for the pitting

EXECUTIVE

(prime minister

and cabinet)

LEGISLATURE (president) EXECUTIVE

Parliamentary Presidential

ELECTORATE

LEGISLATURE

ELECTORATE

Figure 18.1.Basic hierarchical and transactional forms of executive–

legislative relations

comparative executive–legislative relations 347