enhance our understanding of what accounts for the relative strength of legislative
parties (Vote World 2005 ). 4
6Checks
.........................................................................................................................................................................................
The last category of expectations regarding legislatures identiWed at the outset of
this chapter is checks, which include oversight and limitations on the ability of
policy-makers to take action. Demand for a checking function rests in part on a
pervasive distrust of authority, and frequently a speciWc distrust of majority rule, a
term one often sees prefaced with qualiWers such as ‘‘unrestrained,’’ ‘‘plebiscitary,’’
or ‘‘intemperate.’’ 5 It is also based in part on the expectation that checks contribute
to the other legislative ideals discussed thus far, ensuring balanced public debate so
legislatures may fulWll their deliberative role; and reveal information about
policy options and about the motivations of their champions, enhancing the
informational role. To the extent this is the case, legislative checks may in
turn guarantee that the policies ultimately enshrined in statute are durable, thus
aVecting decisiveness.
Given the weight of expectations placed on legislative checks, it is worth being
quite clear about what mechanisms fall under this label. By checks, I mean the
constitutional requirement for legislative approval before governments may act in
areas such as:
. passing statutes that change policy, authorize spending, levy taxes, etc.;
. amending constitutions, thus altering the structure of government or the
distribution of power among its oYcers;. ratifying treaties, declarations of war, or states of emergency initiated by
executives;. approving appointments of high oYcials to executive, judicial, or independent
oYces.Approval most often takes the form of a majority vote, but may also require a
supermajority in some cases, in which case checks—withholding approval
4 It is worth noting that the search for factors that account for legislative party strength does not
imply a normative judgment that stronger is always better. Indeed, legislative parties that exhibit iron-
clad discipline regularly attract criticism and popular demand for reform (Coppedge 1994 ;Carey 2003 ).
5 Madison’s argument inFederalist 63 for the necessity of a Senate to temper the ‘‘passions’’ of House
majorities (which, inFederalist 57 , he had just contended would actually be quite judicious) may be the
most famous along these lines, at least to American audiences, but the theme is widespread.
legislative organization 447