certainly in a manner not achieved to the same degree elsewhere, Atlanta was able
to build for itself a growth dynamic that culminated after the conclusion of Stone’s
study in the staging of the Olympics in 1996.
A number of other studies of regimes in American cities have been undertaken
(see, e.g., DeLeon 1992 ; Whelan, Young, and Lauria 1994 ). In most American
studies business is a key participant in governing coalitions because of the re-
sources it controls. However, the relative strength of business, the composition of
particular businesses engaged in the coalition, and the presence of other interests,
such as neighborhood groups or environmental groups, will vary from place to
place, and may change over time (Mossberger and Stoker 2001 ).
Outside of the USA, the regime concept has been picked up, especially in studies
of the urban regeneration practices of European cites in the 1980 s and 1990 s (for a
review see John 2001 , ch. 3 ). What these studies found (see Mossberger and Stoker
2001 ) is that economic development partnerships in Europe are more likely to be
led by the public sector, with less participation from local businesses, and with less
policy autonomy from national government. Some European scholars have also
pointed out that the economic development partnerships they have observed do
not have the pre-emptive capacity that Stone’s work suggests is characteristic of an
urban regime. Consumption and service issues are still predominant in local
politics, in comparison to economic development (Harding 1997 ). In short, while
coalitions of business and city leaders were found in European cites, no business-
dominated regimes similar to those established in some US cities have operated.
The regime literature oVers a way of studying the institutional capacity to set an
agenda and get things done. It has provided an opportunity for researchers on both
sides of the Atlantic to break from a narrow focus on formal institutions to a
broader concern about how actors from various sectors and organizations can use
their access to institutional resources to build a capacity to act. But the discussion
of regimes has at times been confused. The problems relate to general challenges
faced in making comparisons. As Mossberger and Stoker ( 2001 ) argue, regime
studies have fallen into each of the four traps identiWed by Sartori ( 1991 ):
parochialism, misclassiWcation, degreeism, and concept stretching.
Parochialismrefers to the tendency for comparativists continually to invent new
terms or to use existing ones in an unintended way. The case that is under
investigation by the researcher is considered so unique or diVerent that it deserves
a new or additional label, all of its own. Many regime studies seek to qualify the
term regime by putting a descriptive label in front of it. Dowding et al. ( 1999 )
approach the issue of business participation by making this an optional criterion
for regimes. They deWne eight criteria for what they call ‘‘policy regimes’’ or ‘‘urban
policy regimes’’ ( 1999 , 516 ). Why these regimes are called policy regimes is not
really explained. The exclusion of business as a necessary element from a regime
506 gerry stoker