choice of electoral system is not simply a choice over who wins and who loses
but is also a choice between diVerent—and possibly contradictory—normative
values.
Appeals to the underlying values of democracy may well resonate especially
strongly when voters are involved. Popular pressure may help change and may
come through voters in established democracies. Voter discontent at key aspects
of political performance—the corruption of the system and the lack of respon-
siveness of politicians—was instrumental in pushing changes in Italy and New
Zealand (Sakamoto 1999 ; Vowles 1995 ). Similarly, debates over Canadian reform
involved heavy citizen engagement. At the local level in the USA considerable
experimentation with electoral systems takes place. Individual cities may well
decide to experiment with electoral reform as a consequence of grass roots
lobbying, an important example being San Francisco’s move to Instant
RunoVvoting. 6
As Sakamoto notes, however, it is easy to overstate the importance of popular
pressure in electoral reform. In part this is because there are examples of reform
eVorts—such as Japan’s but also many of the Eastern European changes—that
simply do not involve a popular voice. In part, too, it is because most political
systems just do not allow for voter choice over electoral institutions. Devices such
as the initiative process are simply too rare to give voters a direct say in many
places. Even the much more limited Italian version of direct democracy, while
central to the story of reform in that country, is hardly more common. But even
when political systems are listening or a least being exposed to popular discontent,
it is far from clear that the solution to popular disaVection is to change the electoral
system. There are other, less dramatic and possibly more consequential, changes
that could be put in place. Electoral reform may well present a temporaryWx but it
is not clear that—even after an electoral reform—voters become re-enamored with
the political system.
Nevertheless many electoral reform eVorts are anchored in terms of the narrow
self-interest of political parties. During 2004 – 5 Canada began a series of debates
about electoral reform closely involving popular participation and opinion, most
notably in British Columbia’s ‘‘Citizens Assembly.’’ This reform process began in
Premier Campbell’s 2001 election promise to change the system. This promise had
its roots in the previous election ( 1996 ) when the New Democratic Party won a
majority government, even though Campbell’s Liberals polled more votes. Not
surprisingly, the NDP did not feel the need to legislate any kind of electoral
reform—until it was reduced to a two-member caucus in the 2001 election.
Sakamoto’s account of reform in Japan, for example, refers to the self-interest of
factions within the LDP as a motor for change. A subtler version of self-interest and
6 Instant RunoV(or, as the Australians call it, the Alternative Vote) is a single-member district in
which voters rank order the candidates.
588 shaun bowler