Others scholars, working within the same general principal–agent framework,focus on the delegation of authority to IFIs. They ask why states would choose to
allow them what appears to be a substantial degree of autonomy. Some analysts
Wnd that delegation has not undermined the interests of the most powerful
member states, as delegation is itself a strategy for promoting these interests. For
example, Daniel Nielson and Michael Tierney ( 2003 ) demonstrate that the World
Bank’s environmental policies correlate highly with measures of the environmental
interests of the United States. Ngaire Woods ( 1998 ) has also argued that the United
States exerts very a substantial impact on World Bank and IMF programs. On the
other hand, Erica Gould ( 2003 ) is more skeptical about the ability of member states
to maintain control over IFI actions once they delegate authority. She argues that
the IMF, in its use of conditionality, often responds to privateWnancial actors
rather than state interests.
Thus, the institutionalist perspective has given rise to insights about the design
of the IFIs, particularly focusing on issues of delegation and inXuence. Some have
begun to critique this view of the IFIs, arguing that it underestimates the autonomy
of the staVof IFIs. Through the exercise of authority that is perceived as legitimate,
especially because it has the veneer of science, the IFIs may in fact be able to pursue
agendas that have little relationship to the interests of either major donors or
borrowers (Barnett and Finnemore 2004 ). This line of analysis presents a poten-
tially strong threat to the entire contractual framework, as it conceives of a very
diVerent relationship between states and institutions. For example, it suggests that
we should spend much more time analyzing processes of socialization within
institutions (see Johnston 2001 ). Another perspective suggests that we need to
draw on alternative theories of accountability to make sense of the role of IEIs
(Grant and Keohane 2005 ). While this perspective does not directly challenge the
contractual one, it does suggest that the contractual approach and its emphasis on
principal–agent relationships is too narrow a prism through which to study IEIs.
Issues of accountability have long been a concern both within the World Bank and
among those who study it, leading for example to the creation of an Inspection
Panel in 1993 to investigate complaints about the Bank’s activities (Bradlow 1996 ;
Shihata 1994 ; see also Pauly 1997 ).
The other major set of questions, of course, regards the impact of the IFIs on the
economies of the states where they are active. A literature is emerging around this
topic, and space prevents me from doing justice to it here. However, it is safe to say
that the evidence on the IMF, in particular, suggests that it has not been terribly
eVective in bringing countries high levels of growth (Easterly 2001 ). Countries that
enter IMF programs, rather than relying on them temporarily and then resuming a
‘‘normal’’ growth pattern, tend to remain under IMF tutelage for long periods of
time. IMF programs may increase income inequality even while failing to promote
aggregate growth (Vreeland 2003 ). Scholars have debated the causes of this
apparent lack of eYcacy. Some argue that it is precisely the autonomy of the
668 lisa l. martin