social movements that cross national borders. Smith, ChatWeld, and Pagnucco
( 1997 ), for example, drew on both sociological theory and international relations
theory to address international NGOs and the broader social movements of which
they are part in nine case studies. Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink ( 2002 ) aimed to
bridge the literature on transnationalism, regimes, and norms in the international
relations sub-Weld of political science with sociology’s literature on domestic social
movements. Their volume identiWed three diVerent forms by which non-
governmental groups could work across borders: Transnational advocacy networks,
which are usually informally and loosely linked sets of actors that exchange
information; transnational coalitions that coordinate strategies and/or tactics in
concerted international campaigns; and transnational social movements that ‘‘have
the capacity to generate coordinated and sustained social mobilization in more
than one country to publicly inXuence social change’’ (Khagram, Riker, and
Sikklink 2002 , 8 ). Although the three types operate diVerently, they are all ‘‘forms
of transnational collective action involving non-governmental organizations
interacting with international norms to restructure world politics’’ ( 2002 , 3 ).
In the late 1990 s, a more policy-oriented literature also emerged, exempliWed by
articles in two top journals that focused on the impacts of formally organized
NGOs on world aVairs. InForeign AVairs,Mathews ( 1997 ) focused on broad
normative questions: If NGOs are having a major inXuence on world aVairs, is
that good or bad? She argued that non-state actors in general and NGOs
in particular have been able to inXuence the decisions of the most powerful
governments (such as the United States during the NAFTA negotiations) while
compelling weaker states to modify their behavior signiWcantly (such as Mexico
during the Chiapas rebellion). This shift of power from state to non-state actors
may enhance the ability of the international community to address pressing needs.
But it may also raise problems. First, NGOs’ limited capacity prevents them from
undertaking large-scale endeavors. Second, in trying to expand theirWnancial base,
NGOs may compromise their operational independence. Finally, given that NGOs
are by deWnition usually special-interest groups whose sole purpose is to further
their narrowly deWned objectives, if such organizations begin to replace state
governments, the result could be a fragmented and paralyzed society.
Mathews’ fears that NGOs could create a fragmented, paralyzed global society
echo older arguments by Mancur Olson ( 1982 ) on democratic sclerosis.
He contended that as self-interested groups multiply and lobby to increase their
share of the distributional pie, the outcome of interest group competition is
political gridlock and policy incoherence.
But the evidence from the national level in rich and poor countries alike fails to
support this prediction. If the hypothesis were true, the United States, with its
vibrant citizen sector, should be frozen into immobility by its vast array of
competing interest groups, associations, think tanks, and NGOs. The hypothesis
also suggests that more authoritarian governments that strictly limit the activities
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