which institutions can overcome problems of ‘‘de-institutionalization’’ arising
when the institution does not fulWll the functions it should fulWll: But the question
arises as to why this is the case and speciWcally why, having fulWlled that function in
the past, it no longer does so.
The absence of any part played by ‘‘the polity at large’’ is even clearer in OVe’s
analysis, in the same volume, under the title of ‘‘Designing institutions in East
European transitions’’ (Goodin 1996 , 199 – 226 ). In a section entitled ‘‘Challenges,
breakdowns and survival responses,’’ that author suggests that ‘‘breakdowns of
institutions can occur in response to any of three challenges. First, they [the
institutions] may fail to inculcate thenorms and preferencesthat condition the
loyalty of members... Second, institutions may decay becausealternativesemerge
which allow for the satisfaction of those needs and the fulWlment of those functions
over which the institution used to hold a monopoly.... Third, institutions may
break down because of their manifest failure in performing the functions with
which they are charged’’ (Goodin 1996 , 219 – 20 ; emphasis in original). All three
points refer exclusively to internal problems although in all three cases the break-
down is most likely to occur because those outside the institution, who for some
reason depend on the institution (on the government, for instance), may have
ceased to have conWdence in the institution and its agents. The notion that
institutions ‘‘fail to inculcate norms and preferences’’ clearly shows that the analysis
is undertaken from the point of view of the institution and of its agents: That the
members of the polity at large may not or no longer feel comfortable with the
institution is simply not considered.
Such a state of aVairs is strange.Supportis central to political science and has
indeed concerned political philosophers as well as empiricists for generations: Yet
the point does not appear to be recognized as being at all relevant in the context of
the setting up, life, and death of political institutions, whether these institutions are
organizations or procedures. Probably no political scientist would deny that some
support at least is necessary for regimes to be maintained; probably no political
scientist would deny that this support is subject to Xuctuations. Why should
a notion of this kind not have permeated into the analysis of the political institu-
tionalization process and by extension into the analysis of political institutions?
It is not suggested that the ‘‘external’’ elements of the problem are more
important than the ‘‘internal’’ elements in the process of institutionalization and
of ‘‘de-institutionalization’’ of political institutions. What is pointed out is that
political institutions (as well as a few social institutions which are ‘‘intermittently’’
political) are peculiar, as they take decisions going well beyond the boundaries of
the institution itself. For that reason, those who are the objects of these decisions
aVect the extent to which the institution achieves what its leaders may wish it to do.
Thus, to a degree at least and indeed to a varying degree depending on the regime,
the political culture, and the circumstances, the extent of support for the institu-
tion needs to be taken into account alongside its structure.
about institutions, mainly, but not exclusively, political 727