A touching moment that
even beat winning 4-0
Giles Coren
Page 30
Putin’s hollow regime could collapse quickly
Russia’s system is built on lies but now is the time for generals to tell the Kremlin the truth about this unwinnable war
Comment
nuclear arsenal remains a central
factor in global politics. Yet the
weaknesses of the Russian military
mirror the political system behind it,
a hollow structure that will lose its
reputation and respect very quickly
when its thieving and selfish reality
is revealed to its own people. That
may take months or years, but Putin’s
henchmen would be well advised to
start thinking about their escape
route to Pyongyang.
More immediately, the initial
military errors and systemic failings
mean that Russia cannot now
achieve its goal of a pliant Ukraine,
however much it widens the war and
however many innocent people it
kills. Even Moscow’s close friends
can see that. Belarus is quietly
striving to stay out of the war. China
is host to a surprising debate. One
leading Shanghai academic has been
allowed to publish a paper calling
Russia’s “special military operation”
an “irreversible mistake” and saying
Putin’s best option is to end the war
in peace talks. This does not mean
these countries will change their
approach, but it does show they can
see the truth.
Dare the Russian generals tell Putin
how much has gone wrong, that
multiple military failures have added
to a political disaster for him? Have
they explained, as talks grind on, that
they can only offer a drawn-out and
bloody war? They should tell him the
truth, that he should now seek peace.
They probably won’t, and their place
in the pantheon of the Worst Military
Leaders in History awaits them.FSB officers are now under arrest.
This is a system in which the high
command lies to their forces and the
spy agencies lie to the high command.
To justify what is happening, the
entire power structure lies to the
outside world and the Russian people.
My old sparring partner, foreign
minister Lavrov, even managed to
assert last week that Russia had not
attacked Ukraine at all.
The lies go downwards, upwards
and outwards. It is impossible for the
soldier at the front or a general in
Moscow to know the truth. That is
the web that Putin has spun, and it
has important implications for the
future.
Be clear, this does not mean the
Russian armed forces are spent.
They have been regrouping and will
no doubt learn lessons. And
Moscow’s possession of a vastRussia’s defence minister Sergei Shoygu
has the hardware but lacks a strategyin pairs, but their pilots have not been
trained to fly in larger, sequenced,
formations, except for flypasts at
parades. They look impressive, but
do not have the training hours or
high-quality simulators that are
standard for Nato pilots.
Suddenly, we begin to discern the
nature of Putin’s state: a regime that
has prized the hardware of power
while neglecting the software, that
can stage parades which frighten
observers and drop random bombs
on terrified civilians but would
struggle against a powerful
adversary; a system ostensibly strong
but hollow inside — the natural
outcome of being mired in
corruption and led by a bully, but
only now so clearly revealed.
It is also telling that the Russian
high command only informed
tactical commanders on the ground
that they were going to war, and
what their objectives would be, the
day before the invasion. This led to
woeful co-ordination and planning.
In the words of Rusi experts again:
“Working out which units a
formation is to collaborate with in
order to set up encrypted radios
takes time; studying the map and
assessing routes takes time... The
failure to give subordinates time to
prepare reveals a dysfunctional
command system in which troops
are regarded as an expendable
resource in the pursuit of objectives.”
Here again we can see the
characteristics of Putin’s rule: the
callous carelessness with life, even
on his own side, and the need to fool
even his own army about what was
planned. Tens of thousands of
Russian troops probably believed the
lie that they were on exercises.
Meanwhile, the Kremlin was
believing the intelligence assurances
of the FSB that Ukrainian resistance
would be weak, which is why seniorO
n the night Russia
invaded Ukraine, I was
reading a new book, The
Worst Military Leaders in
History, edited by John
M Jennings and Chuck Steele. The
monumental failings of leadership
described range from the well-
known death of General Custer and
all his men to the less remembered
Athenian leader, Nikias, whose
disastrous attempt to capture
Syracuse led to the collapse of the
entire Athenian empire. Three weeks
on, it seems like a second edition
might have to include the Russian
defence minister, Sergei Shoygu, and
his top brass.
The missile attack on Sunday on a
base in western Ukraine and the
horrendous shelling of cities reminds
us that the Russian armed forces
wield colossal firepower, and their
ability to get going again should not
be underestimated. Nevertheless, in
19 days they have failed to achieve
their objectives despite possessing
vastly superior forces, suffered huge
losses of men and materiel, turned
most of the world against them by
indiscriminate attacks on civilians,
and rendered the political aim of
their war — to unite Ukrainians with
Russians as “one people” —
permanently unattainable. That has
to count as abysmal leadership of
historic proportions. It is important
to understand why this has
happened, and what it means for
what happens next.
Some of Russia’s military
underperformance reflects the fact
that the huge modernisation of its
forces is still work in progress. The
much-vaunted T-14 tank is not yet in
service and the Uran-9 unmanned
combat ground vehicle performed
badly in Syria. But Russia is hardly
unique in experiencing delays in
defence procurement. Much more
seriously, the tactics chosen by
commanders have been wasteful of
resources and their soldiers’ lives,
advancing in dense groups of
vehicles, sticking to roads, failing to
screen their flanks and leaving
airborne troops isolated. All this has
resulted in Russian casualties
probably exceeding those suffered by
the US in six years of war in Iraq.
Added to these elementary failures
of military command is evidence of
poor maintenance of equipment,
leading to many breakdowns and
sophisticated weapons being
abandoned in farmers’ fields.
Perhaps such failings of military
culture and standards are the
product of a system based heavily ongreed, selfishness and corruption
right up to the Kremlin itself. But by
far the most serious problems are on
a strategic scale.
Russia’s inability to establish
command of the air over Ukraine has
mystified most observers, considering
the acquisition of hundreds of
modern warplanes since 2010. The
best potential explanation has come
from the Royal United Services
Institute (Rusi): that the Russian air
force lacks the “practical experience
of how to plan, brief and co-ordinate
complex air operations involving tens
or hundreds of assets in a high-threat
environment”. They can fly singly orHenchmen would be
well advised to start
planning escape routes
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Haguethe times | Tuesday March 15 2022 29