290 CONCLUSION
argument is informed by realist and Foucauldian analysis that explains but
does not in itself morally justify having ‘professions’ that successfully claim
such moral powers, indeed it is presented as a process of elite subordina-
tion. While his sociological analysis is persuasive, it may be argued otherwise
that there are indeed instrumental reasons for supporting such developments
in the rather amoral conception of HRM that is the current norm. If HR
practitioners can succeed in passing themselves offas the moral merchants
of employee interests, then this might help to provide an effective counter-
influence to the exploitative tendencies of business in a neo-liberal economy
to which attention is drawn in the Introduction. This may seem a somewhat
cynical reason for promoting HRM professionalization but, as with the busi-
ness case for CSR, anyone seeking to promote morally acceptable outcomes
has to depend on utilizing social mechanisms that draw on demonstrating the
benefits of self-interested conduct for the general good.
One of the conclusions that has to be drawn from Part I is that what
is and what is not morally acceptable in HRM is a complex matter that is
determined in part by prior views as to what constitutes ethically acceptable
business practice within a particular type of economic system. If we accept, for
instance, Palmer’s and Sorell’s analyses (Chapter 1 and Chapter 12) that the
moral dilemmas that arise in everyday HRM practice manifest the conflicting
values that exist in a pluralist world in which there are not only conflicting
interests, but no agreement as to how these conflicts should be resolved, then
it is not clear that there is sufficient practical agreement as to what constitutes
‘well-being and dignity at work’ let alone how achieving this is to be reconciled
with the generation of wealth.
Given such complexity, it might be tempting to confine HRM to achieving
professional status in the overall pursuit of employee well-being, leaving other
spheres of management to deal with wealth generation. But that would be
to go back on the essential core of specific HRM, namely the contribution
of employee development to competitive advantage. Furthermore, it asserts
an agenda for professionalization which lacks much justification and support
from past, present, or anticipated generic HRM contexts, something that no
contributor to this book recommends we should do. On the other hand, if
we try to balance the twin ethical demands of effective wealth generation
and wealth and decent employment conditions in the one profession, we not
only render the boundary between HR managers and line management highly
porous, but, by keeping generic HRM firmly within the management camp, we
make it impossible to consider HRM practitioners as anything approaching
an autonomous profession with overriding fiduciary duties to their ‘clients’
(Freidson 2001).
Some of these problems could be overcome, but it takes us back to
the inevitable connection between HRM and an ethical/moral conception
that goes beyond the narrow business case for valuing HR in business. In