NONMONOTHEISTIC CONCEPTIONS 105and superimposed on Brahman; reasoning based on
Scripture must negate them both.^8To thought and perception, there appear to be a multiplicity of persons and
things. On an Advaita reading, the Upanishads deny this; so thought and
perception must be “negated” in the sense that what appears to them to be so is
rejected.
What exists, then, for Shankara is nirguna or qualityless Brahman, though
what appears to exist is a multiplicity of physical objects and persons and a
personal God. Until we get to the distinction between appearance and reality, he
is a realist regarding objects, minds, and God; he holds that, “at the level of
appearance,” such things exist. Indeed, he argues strongly for their existence.
But he also holds, on Upanishadic authority, that only qualityless Brahman
exists “at the level of reality.”
How are we to understand this claim? Plainly not in terms of the level of
appearance being the set of things that exist dependently and Brahman being
their independently existing Source. That is the position of Ramanuja and
Madhva. The levels cannot be levels of reality distinguished by presence or
absence of dependence. The levels presumably are in some manner levels of
knowledge or belief, appearance being how things look and reality being how
things are. How are we to understand this notion?
A two-theories account
Taking a cue from Spinoza, a favorite among Advaita Vedantins, one might try
interpreting Advaita Vedanta along the lines of saying that there are two
theories related in certain ways as follows. Suppose we have two theories, each
of which has its own vocabulary; then we will have two theoretical languages,
replete with their conceptual perspectives or worldviews. Each, let us suppose, is
exhaustive – it describes, or attempts to describe, all there is, not of course in
concrete detail but in terms of general properties and kinds and the like. In each,
whatever can be explained is explained. What one theory refers to is the same as
what the other theory refers to, though of course each describes what it refers to
very differently from that of the other. No descriptive term is common between
or shared by both theories.^9 Thus, on the current account, there are two theories
or theoretical languages that have parity of description and parity of
explanatory power. The entities referred to in one language are identical to
those of the other, and the explanatory connections alleged in the one will be
paralleled by explanatory connections alleged in the other.
According to one of these theories, individual persons, physical objects, and a
personal God exist. Since the Vedantic term for persons is atman, we can all this