ARGUMENTS AGAINST MONOTHEISM 131agents. If the truth is as assumed, then in creating moral agents to populate
the best possible world, God is creating agents whose choices will introduce
evil into that world. Since it is logically possible that the truth be as we
have assumed, and logically necessary that the best possible world contain
moral agents, it is logically possible that the best possible world contain
agents who act wrongly, thereby introducing evil into that world. Hence it
is not a logically necessary truth that the best possible world contains no
evil. Nor is it a necessary truth that a morally perfect omnicompetent being
cannot permit evil. But then neither (N1) nor (N2) is true; hence nor is the
logically necessary truth that the critic sought to pair off with (E) There is
evil for the purpose of deriving the denial of (G) God exists. Nor is either
the basis for a successful challenge to the Consistency Strategy.
The evidential issue
Logical consistency with evidential conflict
It is not logically inconsistent of one to believe that almost no residents of
Madison, Wisconsin would vote for Prince Charles as President of the
United States, that Kim is a resident of Madison, and that Kim would vote
for Prince Charles as President. But if one has no particular reason to think
that Kim relevantly differs from her fellow Madisonians, one believes
against the evidence when one picks her as a Prince Charles supporter.
Proposition A is logically consistent with proposition B and The truth of
proposition A is evidence that proposition B is false are not themselves
logically incompatible claims. We have found no reason to think that the
existence of evil is logically incompatible with God’s existence. The
remaining question concerns whether nonetheless the existence of evil is
evidence against the existence of God. If there being evil counts against
there being a God only if either (a) (E) There is evil and (G) God exists are
logically incompatible, or (b) if (E) plus some set S of discernible truths is
logically incompatible with (G), and (a) is false, there remains (b). The
discernible truths added to (E) need not be necessary truths; any old truths
will do. Are there any?
Those who answer affirmatively take it that the existence of evil is
something not to be expected if a morally perfect and omnicompetent God
created the world. Suppose that Aunt Lucy is an exquisite housekeeper.
Suppose too that one must choose whether she is staying in guest room 21
that is neat as a pin or in guest room 22 whose floor is invisible under dirty
clothing. While it is logically possible that she is staying in 22, odds are
Aunt Lucy is staying in 21. If God created the world, perhaps it is logically