ARGUMENTS AGAINST MONOTHEISM 147Religious maturity
An important topic is relevant here about which the author claims no direct
knowledge. In making it, it is assumed that a defensible monotheism cannot
entail that any moral truth is not true, and that genuine religious values
include rather than contradict moral values. Morality deals with what may
not be done to, and what must be done for, people. What goes beyond this is
supererogatory. Monotheistic theology is typically committed to the view
that God is morally good. Thus God is conceived in such a manner as not to
act against morality. But monotheism typically and very plausibly supposes
that full moral maturity, however essential a part thereof, is not identical to
full maturity as a person. Full maturity, it is held, goes beyond morality,
partly by demanding what is morally supererogatory, partly by including
features of character than are not purely and simply moral features. These
matters are deep and complex, but a really nuanced discussion of the
problem of evil cannot ignore them. Often ignored, they nonetheless fall
within the range of what is relevant to the problem of evil.
Suppose that Susan can achieve a state of religious maturity – of
relationship with and likeness to God, in such ways as are available to
created persons – or to possess a degree of religious virtue or have a
religious experience of an important sort, or the like, if Susan is allowed to
experience a certain evil E. Call this state or disposition or experience that
is of high religious value saintliness for lack of a better term. Suppose that
evil E is not a logically necessary condition of anyone reaching saintliness.
It is compatible with this that it is contingently true that Susan will not
reach saintliness unless she does experience E. All of the ways by which one
might reach this goal without enduring evil are ways Susan cannot take
because of choices she might not have made, but has made, or might never
make, but in fact would make. Finally, suppose that God allows Susan to
undergo evil in order that she might reach saintliness. It seems logically
possible that if Susan reaching saintliness is highly valuable, God’s
allowing her to find her way to it by means that include her suffering E is
itself good, not evil. God’s doing so would not be divinely unjustified.
We can now come to the point of this discussion. Consider its relevance
to The Actually Pointless Evil Claim:
2a God would not allow actually pointless evils.
Add to it the definition:
Definition 1: Evil E has an actual (or metaphysical) point if and only
if there is some good G such that (i) E’s obtaining is a