162 ARGUMENTS: MONOTHEISTIC CONCEPTIONSno point. Roweanism presumably reasons as follows: on the evidence we
actually have, an inexplicable evil has no discernible point. Maybe
nonetheless it has a point; maybe, too, there are no pigs and Rhode
Island is a desert. But on the evidence we possess, there are pigs, Rhode
Island is not a desert, and there are pointless evils. It is reasonable to
believe what is properly inferred from or based on our best evidence. So
we are justified in accepting premise 1. Since 3 is obviously true,
and 1 and 3 entail 4, we are justified in accepting 4. So, if
we are also justified in accepting 2***, we are justified in concluding
that there is no God. If Necessarily, God allows no actually pointless
evils is true, then – the Rowean claims – the newest Rowean argument
wins the day. Thus reads the present version of Roweanism.
Here, then, the critic appeals to some such consideration as this:
(E*) If upon careful reflection an evil is inexplicable, the reasonable
conclusion is that it has no actual point.
If (E) or its near kin is true, then the argument succeeds provided its
second premise is also true. The question regarding (E) is why we
should prefer it as opposed to:
(E**) Even if upon careful reflection an evil is inexplicable, it is
reasonable to suspend judgment as to whether it has no actual
point, since we are not possessed of sufficient information and
cognitive power to be able reasonably to claim that were an evil to
have a point, then that evil would not be inexplicable to us.
Deciding whether an inexplicable evil is actually pointless is not
something we must do for practical reasons – not something we must
take a position on in the interests of world peace or better economic
conditions or the like. So while sometimes we must make a judgment
concerning some very tricky moral issue since no decision is worse than
being wrong, a decision between (E*) and (E) is not one of these cases.
Nor will the attractiveness of (E) as a rule for when we must decide
give it any force for cases when we do not.
Unless one has good reason to accept (E) over (E), a Rowean
argument will not work. What can be said in favor of (E*) over (E*) has
to do with the claim that it is (E) that we follow in cases other than
deciding whether inexplicable evils are actually pointless, and we are
inconsistent if we do not follow (E) here. But it is utterly unclear that
we do follow (E) in relevantly similar cases or even whether there are
any relevantly similar cases. The idea that we are inconsistent if we do
not use (E*) in a Rowean manner requires some such claim as this: