ARGUMENTS FOR MONOTHEISM 203Argument for 2
It is not logically impossible that X have logically contingent existence and yet
it be false that X depends for existence on something else – a logically
contingent and necessarily independent being would fit this description, for
example.
Hence both 1 and 2 are true.
Conclusion
Besides requiring PSR*, this version of the Cosmological Argument is
strongest if it can be shown that Necessarily, God exists is false. Only then (if
at all) can one infer to the cause of possibly explicable logically contingent
beings having the properties that a logically contingent being must have if its
existence is to be necessarily inexplicable.
A supplementary argument
An argument distinct from the Cosmological Argument that nonetheless
dwells in the same conceptual neighborhood is the following:
10a It is logically possible that an omnicompetent being exists.
10b If it is logically possible that an omnicompetent being exists, then it is
logically possible that an omnicompetent being destroy everything
material. So:
10c It is logically possible that an omnicompetent being destroy everything
material. (from 10, 10b)
10d If it is logically possible that an omnicompetent being destroy everything
material, then nothing material has necessary existential security. So:
10e Nothing material has necessary existential security. (from 10c, 10d)
Thus far, the argument is obviously valid and the independent (non-inferred)
premises seem to be true. If this is correct, it is a useful supplement to the
Cosmological Argument. A natural off-shoot is this argument:
10e1 If nothing material has necessary existential security, then something
exists that is not material. So:
10e2 Something exists that is not material.
10e3 If something exists that is not material, then materialism is false. So:
10e4 Materialism is false.