ARGUMENTS FOR MONOTHEISM 209S might do than A, and S’s doing A is right (note that being right
does not entail being obligatory; if there is more than one right
way of acting in a given circumstance, one’s obligations in that
circumstance are simply to act in one of those ways).
D2 R is S’s proper ultimate reason for doing A = R is S’s sufficient
reason for doing A, there is no true moral proposition from which
R follows in any way that justifies R, R is true, and S knows that R
is true (every proposition follows from other propositions – any
proposition P follows from [(Q or P) and not-Q] – but not every
proposition follows from others in a way that proves it true; if we
cannot have some knowledge without proving it, we cannot prove
anything).
D3 S is completely rational in doing A = S has a proper ultimate
reason for doing A.
D4 E is an ultimate existence explanation = E explains the truth of a
logically contingent existence proposition by reference to the truth
of an existence proposition whose truth it is logically impossible to
explain.
Statement of the Teleological Argument
1 If an ultimate existence explanation has a teleological explanation
as an essential component, then the agent referred to in that
teleological explanation is completely rational in acting as that
explanation says she acts.
2 If an agent is completely rational in acting in a certain way, then
there can be no further teleological explanation of her acting in
that way.
3 If there can be no further teleological explanation of an agent’s
acting in a certain way, then unless the existence of that agent can
be explained, there is nothing relevant that is left unexplained.
4 If God created the world, God was completely rational in doing so.
According (roughly) to the conclusion of the Cosmological Argument:
5 God created the world.
Hence, from 4 and 5:
6 God was completely rational in doing so.
Hence, from 2 and 6: