222 ARGUMENTS: MONOTHEISTIC CONCEPTIONS(K1) If it is empirically possible that an experience E of kind K provide
evidence in favor of existential proposition P, then it is
empirically possible that an experience E* of kind K provide
evidence against P.
The notion of empirical possibility does not really introduce a new notion
of possibility; it simply amounts to logical consistency with natural laws
and actual conditions. Suppose there were a natural law to the effect that
(i) If an elephant is within ten yards of a peanut, the elephant cries. This,
plus the truth of (ii) Here is an elephant within ten yards of a peanut,
entails (iii) Here is an elephant that is crying. It is logically impossible
that (i) and (ii) be true and (iii) be false. Since (i) is a natural law, and (ii)
an empirical truth, (iii) is also an empirical truth.
Now suppose we have a natural law of the form (i) If A then B does
not obtain, and suppose that (ii) A obtains is something that is always
true in our world but is not a necessary truth – something like There is
energy which might have been false, is true, and presumably is always
true so long as our physical world exists at all. Then (iii) B does not
obtain follows; it is logically impossible that (i) and (ii) be true and
(iii) be false. The truth of not-(iii) B obtains is logically inconsistent
with the truth of (i) – a natural law – and (ii*) – an always prevailing
empirical condition. Then, we shall say, B’s obtaining is empirically
inconsistent.
Suppose that:
(K) If it is logically possible that an experience E of kind K provide
evidence in favor of existential proposition P, then it is logically
possible that an experience E* of kind K provide evidence against
P
is true. Suppose that it were logically impossible that there be
experiential evidence against (T) There is a tiger in the garden. Then, if
(K) is true, Mary could in principle have no sensory experience that
provided evidence against (T) There is a tiger in the garden. Then, given
(K), her as-if-a-tiger-is-in-the-garden experience would not provide
evidence for that claim. If such conditions held, let us say that the
evidential force of Mary’s experience would be logically consumed.
Suppose that:
(K1) If it is empirically possible that an experience E of kind K provide
evidence in favor of existential proposition P, then it is
empirically possible that an experience E* of kind K provide
evidence against P.