224 ARGUMENTS: MONOTHEISTIC CONCEPTIONSany experience that was not disqualified as evidence by (P) will also
not be disqualified as evidence by any of the preceding principles. Our
basic question, then, now becomes: assuming that (P) is at least a
sufficiently strong principle of experiential evidence – at least a
powerful enough criterion to eliminate the mere pretenders among
the candidates for experiences that provide evidence – are at least
apparent experiences of God evidence that God exists?
Question 6: are all the necessary qualifications to (P)
included in (P*)?
It is hard to tell; if additional qualifications are suggested, they can be
looked at one by one. A proof that all of the necessary qualifications are
included is hard to imagine – what, exactly, would such a proof look
like? What one can do is to add all the qualifications one can think of
that are defensible, even if this gives one more than is required.
Question 7: what about the claim that God is ineffable, or
that religious experience is ineffable?
To say of something X that it is seriously and literally ineffable is to say
that (I) For any concept C, C does not apply to X. Since the concept of
ineffability is a concept, to make the claim that anything is seriously
and literally ineffable is to assert something that is necessarily false. So
neither God nor religious experience can be literally ineffable. It is
possible to revise the thesis and say something like (Ia) For any concept
C save the concept of ineffability, C does not apply to X. But X is
ineffable entails X exists, so the concept of existence applies to X and
thus (Ia) is false. One can then try (Ib) For any concept C save the
concepts of ineffability and existence, C does not apply to X. But X
exists and X has no properties is also necessarily false. One can then try
(Ic) For any concept C save the concepts of ineffability, existence, and
having properties, C does not apply to X. If the concept having
properties applies to X, then so does the concept having only consistent
properties, not being both prime and not prime, being either good or
not, and so on. By the time one has finally reached a non-contradictory
thesis, serious and literal ineffability has been left far behind. It is only
serious and literal ineffability that would raise a problem for our
argument.