232 ARGUMENTS: MONOTHEISTIC CONCEPTIONS2 Mary’s experience is counterbalanced as evidence if she has reason to
believe that it is just as likely that she seem to experience God if God
does not exist as it is if God does exist.
Suppose, then, that Mary has a religious experience in which she at least
appears to encounter a majestic, holy, powerful, loving being – an
experience similar to those described earlier as central to monotheistic
traditions. It is very likely that Mary will have no reason whatever to think
that she would seem to experience this being even if it did not exist. This is
particularly likely if she has not been taking drugs that might cause such an
experience. If (as was argued earlier) social science explanations do not
typically “explain away” religious experience, Mary’s experiential evidence
is not canceled. She is also unlikely to have any reason to think that it is
just as likely that she have the experience if the being in question does not
exist as it is that she have it if that being does exist. In the light of the truth
of the basic idea of our principle of experiential evidence – that one’s at
least seeming to experience X is evidence that X exists unless we have some
good reason to think otherwise, one claiming that Mary’s experience is
counterbalanced owes us some particular reason for thinking so. An
argument that God does not exist, even if it had some force, would provide
evidence one way; this would not entail that Mary’s experience did not
provide evidence the other way. It is hard to make a good case that Mary’s
experience, and all others like it, suffer the fate of being counterbalanced.
The remaining relevant terms from (P*) are defined in this manner:
3 Mary’s experience is compromised as evidence if Mary has reason to
believe that it is not logically possible that God exists be
experientially disconfirmed.
4 Mary’s experience is contradicted as evidence if Mary has reason to
believe that it is logically impossible that God exist, or to believe that
the existence of the initial physical conditions we have reason to think
obtain plus the laws of nature are incompatible with God existing.
5 Mary’s experience is confuted as evidence if Mary has reason to
believe that there is a being that is not God but produces what appear
to be experiences of God.
6 Mary’s experience is logically or in fact consumed as evidence if it is
logically impossible, or inconsistent with the existence of the initial
physical conditions we have reason to think obtain, plus the laws of
nature, that there be experiences of the same kind as Mary’s
experience which provide evidence against God exists.
Condition 4 will apply only if Mary has reason to think that any concept of
God adequate to the monotheistic traditions is logically inconsistent or if