268 NONMONOTHEISTIC CONCEPTIONSOne who wishes to make a claim like 3 regarding some religious doctrine
requires that some claims like 1 and 2 are true when one replaces “D” by a
relevant description and “P” by a statement of a relevant doctrine. The role of
the connecting premise may be implicit, necessary for the appeal to experience
but unstated. Like versions of the principle of experiential evidence, the
connecting premises are typically assumed but not asserted; indeed, the
connecting premise typically will simply be an assumed principle of
experiential evidence.
Advaita, Jain, and Buddhist enlightenment experiences are called,
respectively, moksha, kevala, and nirvana experiences. We can expect, then,
appeals to experience of the following sort.
Experiential evidence and enlightenment experiences
Our question concerning enlightenment experience is the same as the one
raised regarding numinous experience: is it direct evidence (evidence not
mediated through theory) for religious belief? If it is such evidence, one will be
able to argue successfully as follows.
Advaita Vedanta
A1 Moksha experiences (in which one realizes one’s identity with
qualityless Brahman) have occurred.
A2 If moksha experiences have occurred, that fact is evidence that We are
identical to qualityless Braham is true. So:
A3 That fact is evidence that We are identical to qualityless Brahman is true.
Jainism
J1 Kevala experiences (in which one realizes one’s existential independence
or ontological security and one’s omniscience) have occurred.
J2 If kevala experiences have occurred, that fact is evidence that We have
existential independence or ontological security and are omniscient is
true. So:
J3 The fact is evidence that We have existential independence or ontological
security and are omniscient is true.
Theravada Buddhism
T1 Nirvana experiences (in which one realizes one’s nature as composed at a
time of momentary elements and over time of a series of bundles of such
elements) have occurred.