272 NONMONOTHEISTIC CONCEPTIONSConsider claims central to Advaita Vedanta, Jainism, and Theravada
Buddhism:
AV We are identical to qualityless Brahman.
J We have existential independence or ontological security and are
omniscient.
TB We are composed at a time of momentary elements and over time of
bundles of such elements.^4
Each of these claims, if they are true at all, are – as their adherents insist – true
whether we know them to be true, and true independent of anyone having any
enlightenment experience.^5 Further, each tradition holds that one can believe
two of these three claims, and have the experience that the tradition that
accepts this claim alleges confirms that claim, without that claim being true. It
seems plain that it is logically possible that one believe any of We are identical
to qualityless Brahman, We have existential independence or ontological
security and are omniscient, or We are composed at a time of a bundle of
momentary elements and over time of a series of bundles of such elements
and believe falsely, just as it is logically possible that one believe oneself to be
more courageous than one is, or free from illness while a disease silently takes
its toll, or devoid of pride while enamored of one’s humility. It may well also be
that in all three cases, one can have the relevant enlightenment experience,
believe the corresponding doctrine, think the experience confirms the doctrine,
and be mistaken on all counts. Each tradition holds views that entail that the
members of the other two traditions are in exactly this position.
None of this is denied by even the strongest proponents of the self-
authenticating character of enlightenment experiences.^6 What is claimed is not
that it is logically impossible that one believe the preferred doctrine and that
doctrine nonetheless be false, but that (i) it is logically impossible that anyone
have an enlightenment experience that self-authenticates a doctrine and the
doctrine nonetheless be false, and (ii) enlightenment experiences (of the right
kind) are self-authenticating regarding (the right) doctrine. While (i) is true by
definition of “self-authentication,” (ii) is a substantial claim that we will
explore.
Descriptions
In exploring it, we begin with this question: What sort of descriptions will be
true of an enlightenment experience that is self-authenticating regarding, say,
a Jain religious doctrine? To put the same question in a different way, what sort
of phenomenology or observable features must such an experience have? Since