ARGUMENTS (2) 279particularly reliable sort of experience, let us restrict the scope of
introspection as follows:
Person S is introspectively aware of state or quality Q only if S being
in or possessing Q depends on S’s being aware of being
in or possessing Q.
One can introspectively seem to oneself to be qualityless, indestructible, or
momentary in the sense that one can believe this to be so. Nothing could
make it true that one was qualityless. Even if one had an experience in
which one seemed to one to have no qualities, this would not show, or even
be evidence that, one was without qualities. In fact, having qualities would
be a condition of having any such experience. Being indestructible would
not prevent one from having a sense that was indestructible – believing
that one is indestructible is not incompatible with one’s being so. But
having such a sense or belief would not by itself be evidence that one was
indestructible. Suppose a momentary being could believe or feel it was
momentary. This would not show, or even be evidence, that it was
indestructible or momentary. Actually being indestructible or actually
being momentary would be a non-introspectible property. Nor is the sort of
property such that, even if one has it, it would be open to introspective
awareness. Nor are any of being qualityless, being indestructible, being
composed of momentary items features or qualities or states such that, if
one has or is in them, one necessarily would know it, or one would more
likely know it rather than not know it, or more likely know it about oneself
than would someone else. Like such features or qualities or states as being
the brightest person in the class, having a good chance to be elected to the
Senate, possessing a more misleading view of oneself than most people,
being identical to the future spouse of the most attractive person in the
class, and a great many others, one could believe oneself to have these
features or qualities even when one did not. One could have these features
or qualities and not believe that one did. Being mistaken in these ways is
not only possible; it would not even be surprising. Behind these facts lies
the more basic fact noted above: being qualityless, being indestructible,
being composed of momentary items are not introspectible properties; even
if one has them, one cannot be introspectively aware of having them.
Further, there is no introspective feature that one can be aware of that
entails one has them.
Since being qualityless, being indestructible, being composed of
momentary items, unlike being in pain, feeling anxious, being euphoric,
are not introspectively accessible or observable states, Principle (P****),
which makes essential reference to introspectibly accessible states, does not
apply to them. Thus the principle