332 RELIGION, MORALITY, FAITH, AND REASONJon intentionally smiled and his intention to smile is an internal
conscious state. Jon’s smiling presumably involves various non-
conscious physical states that are causally intermediate to Jon’s smiling;
on a determinist model, they occur in a causal chain at which his
intention to smile is at one end and his smiling is at the other end.
Hence Scenarios 1 and 2 do not fit. Since a state internal to Jon is
involved, we can eliminate Scenarios 4 through 6. Only one scenario
remains:
Scenario 3: A set of states internal to Jon at T-1, some of which are
conscious and some of which are not.
Suppose Jon made a conscious decision to smile before he smiled and
consider, not Jon’s smiling, but Jon’s deciding (at T-1) to smile-at-T; we
have again six scenarios exactly analogous to our first six. There may be
no conscious state of Jon which, on a determinist model, is the conscious
cause of his decision. Then Scenarios 2 and 3, each of which refer to
conscious states internal to Jon, are eliminated. Since Sue’s presence
elicited and, on a determinist view, forms part of a causal chain whose
earlier members render Jon’s smiling in fact inevitable, it is not only
Jon’s internal states that cause his decision. So Scenario 1, which refers
only to Jon’s non-conscious internal states, is eliminated. If no
conscious states external to Jon play a causal role in yielding his
decision to smile then only Scenario 4 remains.
A libertarian can maintain that, under exactly the conditions in which
Jon decides to smile,^25 he also could have refrained from choosing to
smile, and either choice would be compatible with the truth about the
past, the laws of logic, and the laws of nature. A determinist cannot say
this. She must hold that Jon’s deciding (at T-1) to smile-at-T is related
to some state of affairs A at T-2 such that A’s obtaining at T-2 is, given
the truth about the past, the laws of logic and the laws of nature, not
compatible with Jon’s not deciding (at T-1) to smile-at-T. Since a
compatibilist must give an account of action compatible with
determinism being true, she must agree with the determinist.
If we assume Jon to have come to exist at some time finitely past,
then in tracing the causal chain that has Jon’s smiling at T and Jon’s
deciding (at T-1) to smile (at T) as later members, we will come to a
scenario that refers to no states of Jon whatever, either internal or
external, and indeed to no states internal to any non-divine person –
states obtaining before any non-divine person graced the world’s stage.
Since this is so, we may as well simplify things and take Jon’s deciding
(at T-1) to smile (at T) itself to be such a state – a state caused by no
state internal to Jon (and none internal to any other non-divine person).