FAITH AND REASON 351theoretical claims in science, they are something different from either
sensory reports or reports of lines of abstract reasoning. How, then, might
they be rationally assessed? Taking our cue from the noted similarity to
theoretical claims in science, let us briefly consider two perspectives in the
philosophy of science.
Confirmationism and falsificationism
A light touch on philosophy of science
Some simple definitions will facilitate stating these two perspectives.
Definition 1: X is a truth condition of proposition P = P is true if and
only if X obtains.
Thus Sam is sad now has as its truth condition Sam’s being sad now.
Proving that a proposition is true is also proving that its truth condition
obtains; giving reason for thinking a proposition true is giving reason to
think its truth condition obtains.
Definition 2: S is an observation statement if and only if S ascribes an
observable quality to an observable object.
The car is red, The table is brown, The cat is black, This coffee is bitter are
observation statements.
Definition 3: G is a generalization over observation statements if and
only if G is of the form All X’s are Q and G is formed by
inferring it from observation statements of the form X1 is
Q, X2 is Q, X3 is Q etc. and G is not simply a conjunct of
observation statements.
Definition 4: T is a theoretical statement if and only if T is neither an
observation statement nor a generalization over
observation statements and T’s truth would explain the
truth of some observation statement or generalization
over observation statements.
Definition 5: E is a relevant explanation of P if and only if (i) E is true
entails P is true, and (ii) E is true is either a scientific or a
personal explanation of P is true.
Definition 5a: E is a scientific explanation of P only if E’s truth
condition obtaining is related by law to P’s truth
condition obtaining.