354 RELIGION, MORALITY, FAITH, AND REASONFalsificationism
Falsificationism rejects this notion. Why should the fact that If there
is a leprechaun who has absolute power over the location of
computers who wants my computer to be on my desk, that will explain
my computer being on my desk and There is a leprechaun who has
absolute power over the location of computers who wants my
computer to be on my desk would explain My computer is on my desk
be taken to confirm the conjunction (If there is a leprechaun who has
absolute power over the location of computers who wants my
computer to be on my desk, that will explain my computer being on
my desk and There is a leprechaun who has absolute power over the
location of computers who wants my computer to be on my desk)? The
idea that it does so, but by so little that one hardly notices it, is more
desperation than defense.^10
Falsificationism accepts these claims:
1 Theory T is a good theory regarding data F if and only if T has
not been falsified and if T has explanatory power regarding F.
1a T has explanatory power regarding F if and only if If T is true
then its truth explains that F obtains.
1b T has not been falsified if and only if T has been rigorously
tested and we still have no reason to think that T is false.
2 Being confirmed by F is nothing more than not having been
falsified and having explanatory power regarding F.
3 While one might have to continue to work within the framework
of a falsified theory (one needs some context for research and a
false theory may provide a useful context), other things being
equal it is better to work within a non-falsified theory.
4 A non-falsified theory is uninteresting regarding F if its truth
would not explain Fâs obtaining; there is no point in pursuing
theories that are uninteresting regarding the data that we
possess.
5 It is reasonable to believe any available relevant theory that is
unfalsified, has explanatory power, and has no competitors.
6 In cases of competing available relevant unfalsified theories T1
and T2 with explanatory power, it is reasonable to believe (T1 or
T2) and to endeavor to falsify one or the other.
6a Theories T1 and T2 are competing if and only if (i) the things that
each explains are the same as what the other explains, or (ii) some
proposition P1 essential to T1 and some proposition P2 essential
to T2 are such that it is logically impossible that both be true.^11