NOTES 38728 For example, the Jain view, fleshed out, includes the implausible claims that Every
person is inherently omniscient, though exercise of this capacity is frustrated by
our being embodied and It is impossible that anything cause a person to cease to
exist, though a person can be caused not to be embodied in the body she presently
occupies (or in any body at all). That our existence involves latent omniscience and
necessary ontological independence are claims quite independent of anything
discussed here, and I should not like to have to defend them.
29 That is, if Sam at T is identical to Sam at T1, then necessarily, Sam at T is identical
to Sam at T1 – which is to be distinguished from Sam at T enjoys logically necessary
existence, as does Sam at T1.
30 James W. Cornman and Keith Lehrer, Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An
Introduction (New York: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 238–9.
31 Materialists who are property dualists are often willing to grant that physical things
come in at least two kinds – those capable of self-consciousness and those not (or at
least those capable of consciousness and those not – though if the not capable of
consciousness/capable of consciousness distinction is kind-defining or essential, it
is hard to see why the same should not be said regarding the not capable of self-
consciousness/capable of self-consciousness distinction).
32 Some philosophers have embraced the view that there are abstract objects (immaterial
substances not capable of consciousness) as well as material substances. But they
have continued to reject the idea that there are any mental substances.
33 This is, of course, perfectly compatible with determinism being false.
13 Arguments concerning nonmonotheistic conceptions (2)
1 In fact, the terminology used to refer to the relevant experiences is not as neat as
these characterizations suggest. For example, Jainism not infrequently used “nirvana”
to refer to kevala experiences.
2 One might add something along the lines of S has seen both that he had E and that
it is logically impossible that he have E and P be false. Nothing argued here will
depend on whether we add this last consideration or not, so long as it is not the case
that Chandra has E but believes P, not on the basis of his having had E, but on some
other basis. Even if E is self-authenticating regarding a proposition P, and person S
has E, E does not self-authenticate P to S if the only reason that S accepts P is not
that S had E and E fits a description such that if E occurs then this is (conclusive)
evidence for P. For example, if S would otherwise not accept P unless his great-
grandfather had asserted P, and would have accepted P on that basis even without
having had E, then even if E is conclusive evidence for P, S does not accept P on that
basis and so E is not for S self-authenticating regarding P.
3 One might put self-authentication along these lines: E is self-authenticating to
Chandra regarding P if and only if (i) Chandra cannot be mistaken about a belief B
that Chandra evidentially rests on his experience E, (ii) B cannot be false if Chandra
has E, (iii) it is logically impossible that Chandra be wrong about whether Chandra
has E, and (iv) Chandra believes that he had E. Again, nothing we say here would be
changed if we characterized self-authentication along these lines.
4 These are only one way of putting these views, and do not exhaust the views central
to these traditions. But they are accurate and representative, fully fair for illustrative
purposes here.
5 Even if some claim is knowable only by someone who has an enlightenment
experience it does not follow that it is true only if someone has an enlightenment