SORTS OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 49omniscient, knowing the entire history of the world. This is a different sort
of claim – a claim that the subject has, not merely a sense of calm and bliss,
but knowledge of a truly formidable range. It ascribes a cognitive state of
knowledge that is quite distinct from any merely affective state of feeling.
It is apparently reported on behalf of someone else (a follower of the Jain
saint and founder Mahavira reports it regarding an experience that
Mahavira is said to have had; a similar experience is ascribed to Gotama
Buddha).
Experiences 20 through 24 are like the preceding two groups in that they
ascribe psychological states of calm and bliss to their subjects, but unlike
either in that a further report is offered. It at least appears to the subject of
the experience that he experiences a being that is ineffable or beyond all
description [see 21], or a being who is “Maker, Lord” [see 20], with whom
the subject is identical. These cases raise especially difficult questions
regarding interpretation. Let us note but one element of them, an element
specified in all these descriptions but one [namely, 21] – that the subject is
identical to the being apparently experienced.
There are various issues to be considered regarding Experiences 1–24. It
is reasonable to suppose that there have been experiences. It isn’t likely
that such descriptions are simply made up. Further, experiences like these
have been reported by monks and mystics, cross-culturally and cross-
temporally. Strictly, after all, what has been quoted is a set of descriptions
of experiences or of comments about experiences. Now consider this
expansion of Criterion 2a.
Criterion 3*: Experience A is of a different sort from experience B if:
(i) A is veridical, there is a self-conscious being of
impressive holiness whose presence elicits a tendency to
worship, whereas it is false that if experience B is
veridical then there is a self-conscious being of
impressive holiness whose presence elicits a tendency to
worship; or (ii) A is veridical, then one is something like
omniscient, whereas it is false that if B is veridical then
one is something like omniscient; (iii) A is veridical then
one is identical to the apparent object of one’s experience
whereas if B is veridical then it is false that one is
identical to the apparent object of one’s experience.^7
It seems clear that Criteria 1 through 3 do distinguish what, if they actually
occur, will be different sorts of experiences, where their being of different
sorts is relevant to what their information potential, if any, turns out to be.
Further, if there actually do occur experiences of the sort that
authoritative-within-their-traditions religious texts claim have occurred,