RELIGIOUS PLURALISM 73
distinguishes between us and ultimate reality in a way that Advaita
Vedanta and absolutist Mahayana Buddhism (to take but two examples)
deny. So Minimally Restrictive RP fails as well.
The importance to RP of (RPE)
According to RP, the Real is not anything described within any of the
religious traditions – not Jahweh, the Father, Allah, the Buddha or the
Buddha-nature, Brahman, Atman, Jiva, or whatever. It is supposed to be
what is experienced as all these things, and more. Of course, being
experienced as Jahweh, the Father, Allah, the Buddha or the Buddha-
nature, Brahman, Atman, Jiva, etc. is also not a property – neither a quality
nor a relation – generated by logic alone. Any such ascription to the Real –
another ascription essential to RP – is bogus on RP terms.
This suggests the possibility that perhaps RP should simply drop the
claim that only properties generated by logic can apply to the Real. After
all, RP makes a career of violating the rule that only properties generated
by logic may be ascribed to the Real. So one who accepts RP might as well
abandon in theory what it habitually violates in practice. This suggestion
ignores the crucial role that the claim that only properties that are
generated by logic may properly be ascribed to the Real plays in RP.
Professor Hick is aware of that role.
The gist of the reasoning behind the various RP restrictions is that if one
does not limit RP-approved descriptions of the Real to properties generated
by logic alone, one has no basis in RP for not doing one or the other of two
RP-forbidden things:
1 One might ascribe to the Real either only the properties ascribed to
Jahweh by Judaism, or to the Father by Christianity, or to Allah by
Islam, or to the Buddha-nature by Mahayana Buddhism, etc. and then
allow other ascriptions only if they are compatible with the favored
ascription (this would treat one religion as true, the others as
importantly false) or
2 One might try to ascribe to the Real all of the properties ascribed to
Jahweh by Judaism, the Father by Christianity, Allah by Islam, the
Buddha-nature by Mahayana Buddhism, etc. with the result that the
Real allegedly has a lot of logically inconsistent properties (this would
treat all religions as true).
Even with the few examples given, and especially if one considers the long
list of alternatives not mentioned, two things should be clear: