juvenile Boot ('amp 271tools to curb recidivism. As illustrated in the case of Johnny, it may not be enough
to simply provide these youths with the skills and expect them to leave the boot
camp and be able to function in their natural environment.
Peterson (1996) reports that the pilot programs evaluated by the OJJDP reveal
that there was no significant difference in recidivism between those in the boot-
camp programs and those in control programs. Similarly, in a study conducted by
MacKenzie and Souryal (1994), an evaluation of boot-camp programs in eight states
revealed that such programs did not reduce recidivism rates for juvenile offenders in
five of the eight states investigated. In the three states that did show lower recidivism
rates for participants in the boot-camp programs, juveniles were provided intensive
follow-up supervision (Reid-MacNevin, 1997).
After examining their meta-analysis, Lundman, 1993; Morash & Rucker, 1990,
report that boot camp participants may actually have higher rates of recidivism than
those who participate in traditional incarceration. It is difficult to properly determine
whether this is due to the increased monitoring that boot-camp graduates receive
following their release, thereby increasing their chance for subsequent apprehension.
However, supporters of boot-camp facilities suggest that recidivism rates are not
appropriate measures of a successful program (Osier, 1991).
Several explanations have been offered describing why boot camps do not have
a general effect on recidivism. From a criminological perspective, boot camps are
theoretically based on deterrence theory. As noted by Reid-MacNevin (1997),
"correctional research has shown time and again that deterrence-based criminal
justice interventions do not work" (p. 156). This philosophy of deterrence has
been repeatedly tested within the criminal justice system through such programs as
Scared Straight. These programs assume that juvenile delinquents can be scared and
intimidated into engaging in prosocial behavior and respecting authority (Welch,
1997). Unfortunately, such programs have consistently reported unsuccessful de-
terrence effects. In 1992, Lipsey conducted a meta-analysis of 443 studies between
1950 and 1992 which revealed that deterrence programs such as boot camps had
negative effects on juvenile delinquents. Therefore, research has not only shown that
boot camps do not lower the rate of reoffending by juveniles, but more importantly,
that youths may be negatively effected by such programs.
From a psychological perspective, research has examined the image of masculin-
ity which is portrayed in boot-camp programs. Morash and Rucker (1990) suggest
that the confrontation and demanding nature of boot camps illustrate aggression
and thus produce aggressive behavior among participants. This can be explained
through social learning theory, which maintains that behavior is acquired through
modeling the behavior of others. Such learning is particularly found among adoles-
cents. Therefore, according to Morash and Rucker, the goal of teaching juveniles
prosocial behavior is not being achieved in correctional boot camps.
As noted by Correia (1997), boot camps are implemented in an artificial en-
vironment and, therefore, any behavioral changes that are made by an offender
will most likely not be reinforced when the juvenile returns to his or her natural