TheEconomistMarch19th 2022 BriefingThewarinUkraine 19
DeparturesfromUkraine, Mar 2022
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betweenRomaniaandMoldova
To March th
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Crimea
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UKRAINE
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By the end of Wednesday March 16th over
3m Ukrainians had left their country. The
civilian displacement is now the largest
such exodus in Europe since the second
world war, but still smaller than that from
Syria’s civil war.
The flow of refugees
@ZelnskyyUA Twitter followers, 2022, m
February March
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Research and Security Policy in Hamburg.
Mr Meier sees “uncontrolled escalation
as a result of mishaps, false flags or misun
derstood signalling” as the most likely
routes to disaster. Mishaps are, after all, a
fact of life, and people at or on the edge of a
war get nervous. On March 9th, as if to pro
vide a worked example, a mistake during
routine maintenance saw a nuclearcap
able (but in this case unarmed) Indian mis
sile fired into Pakistan, its nucleararmed
neighbour. India’s sheepish apology on the
11th would have been too little too late if
tensions had been high.
Whatever chain of events might bring it
about,the irradiation of even a sliver of Uk
raine would be a shocking moment for Eu
rope and the world. Western governments
would face enormous pressure to respond.
Yet to attack Russia in kind (rung 27: “Ex
emplary Attack on Military”) would be to
invite further nuclear use against Ameri
can and European cities (rung 29: “Exem
plary Attacks on Population”). Khan had
further rungs in which the adversaries
traded forces and cities with ever more
abandon. The doctrine of mutually as
sured destruction suggests that, once cit
ies are being lost, things will quickly get up
close to rung 44: “Spasm or Insensate War”.
The alternative of attempting to bring
Mr Putin down using only conventional
weapons, though, would not necessarily
see him abide by the same constraint, es
pecially if the attempt to dislodge him
seemed close to success: back to those top
most rungs. But to do nothing might well
prove intolerable; the need to show that
nuclear weapons did not allow impunity
could prove overwhelming.
A series of war games which took place
during the Obama administration hint at
the range of possible responses. In “The
Bomb: Presidents, Generals, and the Secret
History of Nuclear War”, Fred Kaplan, a
journalist, describes the war gamers’ re
sponse to a scenario in which Russia in
vaded a Baltic state and fired a tactical nuc
lear weapon at a German base to halt the
nato fightback.
By the pale afternoon
When one group of generals and senior ad
visers played out this scenario Colin Kahl,
then Vicepresident Joe Biden’s national
security adviser, argued that it was better
to keep fighting conventionally and isolate
Russia diplomatically. His advice was tak
en. When cabinet secretaries and military
chiefs played the same game a month later
they decided to nuke Belarus, even though
it had no involvement in the war.
In all this, it is important to distinguish
relative risk from absolute risk. The chanc
es of an escalating confrontation leading
to the use of nuclear weapons in Europe
are higher than at any time since 1962. That
does not mean such a development is like
ly. For Mr Putin to escalate the war in a way
which brings innato would be to invite a
decisive defeat in Ukraine; to plan on stav
ing off that defeat by nuclear means would
be to risk massive retaliation.
But the stakes are higher—perhaps ex
istential—for Mr Putin than for his West
ern opponents. “Direct confrontation be
tween natoand Russia is world war three,”
warned Joe Biden, America’s president, on
March 11th. That made it “something we
must strive to prevent”. Mr Putin might
think there are rewards to be gained by
looking less committed to that prevention.
Thomas Schelling, an economist and
nuclear strategist, once observed that de
terrent threats were “a matter of resolve,
impetuosity, plain obstinacy” (see our Free
exchange column). These were not easy
qualities to fake, he noted: “It is not easy to
change our character; and becoming fanat
ic or impetuous would be a high price to
pay for making our threats convincing.” A
man who invades Ukraine without telling
most of his ministers or his troops that he
is about to do so has already established
his character.
For some Western officials, this asym
metry in character and reward underscores
the need for a swift settlement even if it fa
vours the Kremlin. Others note that just
saying such things gives Mr Putin an ad
vantage that he will press until he is firmly
pressed back against. “nato’s fear of a nuc
lear exchange as the inevitable [end of the
line]...has been ruthlessly leveraged by Pu
tin,” laments John Raine, a former British
diplomat. “He has used it to create a very
large space in which he can wage conven
tional war in Europe without a military re
sponse from nato.” The danger is that Mr
Putin tries to enlarge that space further—
or misjudges its bounds. n