The Economist March 19th 2022 51
ChinaChinaandRussia
Testing the “limitless”
T
ime is noton the side of most of those
involved in Ukraine’s horrors. Every
hour brings new agonies for the Ukrainian
people and government. Each passing day
exposes, with greater clarity, the miscalcu
lation of Russia’s leader, Vladimir Putin, in
launching a war of choice against a country
he underestimated. For America and its al
lies, admiration for Ukraine’s resistance is
tempered by fears that it cannot last for ev
er, as Mr Putin escalates the killing.
In contrast, one great power, China, is a
study in patience. Privately, its officials
project confidence that time will deliver a
postwar settlement that is greatly to Chi
na’s advantage. Since the invasionon Feb
ruary 24th, China has rebuffed repeated
pleas from foreign governments that it
work more actively to persuade Russia—its
“rocksolid” friend—to put a swift end to
the mayhem. It has gone no further than
boilerplate calls for restraint by all parties
in the conflict. Western impatience is
showing, with foreign ministers from
Spain to Singapore calling on China to ex
ert its “enormous influence” on Russia.
China likes to present itself as a peace
loving giant opposed to foreign incur
sions. In Beijing and at the un, its envoys
were left visibly squirming in the immedi
ate aftermath of the invasion, having dis
missed American warnings of war as lies.
Startled by Russia’s subsequent ineptitude
on the battlefield, they peppered foreign
interlocutors with questions about the
fighting. Meanwhile, China maintained a
stance of proRussian pseudoneutrality,
murmuring about the need for peace while
echoing Mr Putin’s arguments that he is
defending Russia against America and its
expanding natoalliance.
Now Western governments fear that
China may have decided to “sit back and
watch the disaster”, as a diplomat puts it.
In their analysis, China expects Russian
brute force to prevail within weeks. They
worry that the plan of Chinese leaders is to
be more assertive in pushing for a ceasefire
only once Mr Putin has avoided humiliation, perhaps by taking the Ukrainian cap
ital, Kyiv, which is being shelled. Then Chi
na may offer to rebuild Ukraine’s shattered
cities, hoping that its economic heft will
oblige other countries to forget weeks of
Chinese indifference to Russian crimes.
China has good reason to wish for an
outcome that will satisfy Mr Putin. Hu
miliation for Russia’s leader—or worse
still, his overthrow—would leave China’s
president, Xi Jinping, personally exposed.
Mr Xi signed a joint statement with Mr Pu
tin less than a month before the invasion,
declaring that “friendship between the two
states has no limits.” It also expressed op
position to any further expansion of nato
and to American alliancebuilding in Asia.
It described their own political systems as
“genuine democracy” and portrayed ef
forts to promote the West’s version of it as a
“serious” threat to global peace. It is a high
stakes year for Mr Xi, who hopes to secure a
third term as Communist Party chief late in
2022, violating recent retirement norms.
He can ill afford to be seen backing a loser.
But no matter how the war unfolds, Chi
na will treat its relationship with the
Kremlin as a means of boosting Chinese
power, not Russia’s. America has reported
ly shared intelligence with allied govern
ments showing that Russia has asked Chi
na for drones, surfacetoair missiles and
other military aid. China’s foreign ministry
has called the reports “disinformation”. Mr
Xi has no desire to share the blame for Mr
Putin’s war, “best friend” though he may
be. Nor are there signs of China hasteningB EIJING
Despite what their rulers say, the friendship between China and Russia
has boundaries
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