Saddam Hussein
ity scores of Saddam Hussein, of immediate concern in the present
chapter, are shown in table 18.2).
- On average, Saddam Hussein (and other highly involved lead-
ers, such as President Bush) showed lower complexity during the
Gulf Crisis than did the leaders of less involved nations. This rinding
supports the disruptive stress hypothesis, which states that severe
and/or prolonged stress leads to reduced complexity because of a
depletion of psychological and other resources (e.g., Suedfeld and
Rank 1976; Suedfeld, Corteen, and McCormick 1986).
- In the two months prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, which
precipitated the Gulf Crisis, Hussein's complexity was relatively
high. It dropped noticeably prior to the invasion, as had been found
in previous studies of surprise armed attacks (Suedfeld and Bluck
1988). His complexity increased after the invasion and rose even fur-
ther once the invasion was successfully completed and his stress level
decreased.
- During the late summer, fall, and early winter of 1990, as his-
tory recorded worldwide public excitement regarding the situation
in the Persian Gulf, condemnation of the invasion by the UN, inter-
national economic sanctions (embargo and blockade) against Iraq,
attempts by the UN secretary general as well as individual nations to
bring about Iraq's withdrawal through diplomatic means, and—
later in the year—the gathering of coalition military forces and the
issuing of a deadline for Iraqi withdrawal, Hussein's complexity lev-
els were slightly above the level seen after the victorious invasion.
There was less of an increase in complexity than would be predicted
by the cognitive manager hypothesis for leaders involved in compli-
cated negotiations (Suedfeld 1992a); one inference might be that
Hussein was not negotiating very seriously (and/or he did not believe
that the coalition was negotiating seriously) in the sense of actually
intending or expecting to develop a compromise solution. A much
later episode showed the same pattern: in 1998, Hussein precipi-
tated a confrontation with the UN just when he had a seemingly
good opportunity to achieve an end to the economic sanctions
against Iraq. As Newsweek (1998) put it, Clinton "learned that it may
be easier to punish Saddam than to negotiate with him" (8).
- His complexity showed a larger increase as the Security Coun-
cil's deadline for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait (January 15, 1991)
