The Psychological Assessment of Political Leadersthe self (Tetlock 1981b; Tetlock, Hannum, and Micheletti 1984).
Earlier research (e.g., Suedfeld, Tetlock, and Ramirez 1977) has
identified situations where impression management efforts concen-
trated on content, not structure, which may be the general pattern.
Otherwise, one would expect Saddam Hussein to project a picture of
flexible willingness to consider options when there was a chance to
avert an attack by what would doubtless be massive forces (October
through December 1990) and, on the other hand, to radiate strength
and single-minded determination while an attack was actually
occurring (mid-January through the end of February 1991). His pat-
tern was actually the opposite of these intuitively appealing
hypotheses. In this instance, the data are more compatible with the
hypothesis that complexity scores show how the individual actually
thinks about the situation rather than being determined by how he
wants to appear to others.
Although in one earlier study we followed the complexity pattern
of a military field commander before, during, and after a major war
(Suedfeld, Corteen, and McCormick 1986), we had never before con-
tinued the complexity scoring of governmental leaders throughout
the military conflict that capped an international crisis. In the two
Gulf War studies, this enabled us to discover interesting aspects of
Saddam Hussein's cognitive style; in addition, comparisons among
other leaders were relevant to a number of theoretical postulates of
integrative complexity theory.