10 Leaders TheEconomistMarch26th 2022
A
n outbreakofcovid19onthescaleChinaisexperiencing
would barely register in most countries. Muchoftheworld
has decided to live with the virus. Not China, though.Sofarin
March it has recorded around 27,000 new localsymptomatic
cases—and each one is viewed as a threat to thegovernment’s
“zerocovid” policy. For two years China has smotheredout
breaks using masstesting, strict lockdowns andbytrackingits
people in ways that would make Mark Zuckerbergblush.
Chinese leaders think their policy a huge success.TheEcono-
mistestimates that the country’s death rate fromcovidis5%of
America’s. The Chinese economy has expandedby10.5%inthe
past two years, compared with 2.4% in America and0.4%inad
vanced economies generally. China’s covid controls“demon
strate the advantages” of the Chinese Commu
nist Party’s leadership and the socialist system,
boasts Xi Jinping, the president. All the signs
are that his people tend to agree.
Yet the party hid the start of the pandemic,
and seemingly failed to anticipate the difficulty
of crushing a highly transmissible variant like
Omicron (see China section). China’s leaders
have acted as if they could close off their coun
try until covid went away. Instead, sketchy preparation for an
Omicrontype outbreak has put China at risk of a catastrophe.
The experience of Hong Kong shows what could happen. Like
the mainland, Hong Kong once boasted a very low casecount.
But Omicron has overwhelmed the city, which now has the high
est daily deathrate in the world from the virus. Hospitals have
left patients waiting in loading bays and car parks. The vast ma
jority of the dead have been unvaccinated old folk. When the
outbreak began, around 65% of over80s had not been jabbed.
The risks are similar on the mainland. Among those 80 and
older, only 51% have received two jabs, and less than 20% have
had a booster. Many Hong Kongers were given Western vaccines.
The Chinese government, apparently for political reasons, re
fusestoallowtheseonthemainland.Threedosesofthehome
grownkinddooffersomeprotectionagainstseverediseaseand
death,butitseemstowanemorequicklythantheprotection
providedbyWesternvaccines.
Fornow,Chinahaslittlechoicebuttostickwithitscovid
controls.Theproblemsgobeyondvulnerableoldpeople.Chi
na’sskimpilyfundedhealthsystemisillequippedtohandlea
bigwave.UsingHongKong’smortalityratesasa guide,a large
outbreakonthemainlandwouldresultinmillionsofdeaths.
ThelingeringtroubleisthatChineseofficialslosetheirjobsif an
outbreakoccursontheirwatch.Fearofthesackcreatesincen
tivestoinventsometimescruelandirrationallocalrules.
Inthelongerterm,though,changeisinevitable.Moretrans
missiblevariantslikeOmicronmakethecostof
enforcingzerocovidveryhigh.Todaytensof
millions ofpeoplearelockeddown. Morgan
Stanley,abank,thinksChina’s gdpmaynot
growatallthisquartercomparedwiththelast.
Thatcouldaffecttheglobaleconomy.Restric
tions inShanghaiandShenzhen,accounting
for morethan16%ofChina’sexports,raised
alarmonceagainaboutsupplychains.
China needs to help its people live with covid. It has made a
start by allowing athome tests, and sending patients with mild
symptoms to isolation centres, not hospital. Mr Xi has urged of
ficials to cut the economic impact of covid controls. More must
be done. The elderly and vulnerable need vaccinating and boost
ing, fast. China has approved an antiviral pill, Paxlovid, from an
American firm, Pfizer: why not use Western vaccines, too?
But Mr Xi still seems attached to zerocovid in the longer
term. Having staked its legitimacy on keeping cases near zero,
the party is loth to change strategy. Soon it will have no choice.
Even if China succeeds in seeing off this wave, another will fol
low. The government needs to devote as much energy to chart
ing a path out of the zerocovid policy as it has to enforcingit.n
It will eventually have to livewiththecoronavirus.ButChinahasa lotofworktodofirst
Covid-19 in mainland China
Daily new confirmed symptomatic cases
Feb 2022 Mar
4,
2,
0
Escaping zero-covid
China
V
ladimir putin’s epochchanging miscalculation over Uk
raine was the outcome of a trio of missiondefining mis
judgments. One was that Ukraine’s government would collapse
quickly. Another was that his modernised army would be domi
nant. The last was that America, in irreversible decline, was no
longer capable of leadership. For Ukraine to be defeated, Mr Pu
tin had only to get one premise right.
The first two misjudgments have caused general surprise.
The third has stirred up general interest, among allies and foes
alike. In recent years America has seemed less committed to the
institutions it created after the second world war, largely as a re
sult of its own disastrous occupation of Iraq following the at
tacks of September 11th 2001. Barack Obama chose to “reset” rela
tions with Russia after it invaded Georgia in 2008 and failed to
enforce a red line against the use of chemical weapons in Syria.
Donald Trump accused his allies of duping America and called
nato “obsolete”. After America’s humiliating flight from Kabul
last summer, Mr Putin seemed to have concluded that Joe Biden
would be unable or unwilling to do much for Ukraine.
Today, as Mr Biden lands in Europe for nato, g7 and eusum
mits, it is clear that America has confounded Mr Putin by being
innovative, agile and resolute (see United States section). It
For all America’s success in supporting Ukraine, hard times lie ahead
Unfinished business
Ukraine