TheEconomistMarch26th 2022 BriefingThewarinUkraine 17
“Are youconfidentthatUkrainewillbeableto
repel Russia’sattack?”%ofUkrainianspolled, 2022
100
50
0
Jan Feb Mar
No
Yes
↑ The aftermath of Russian bombing.
Fires burn in Livoberezhnyi, a residential
district, on the morning of March 22nd.
Maternity
hospital
Massgravesites
Drama
school
Mariupol
Livoberezhnyi
Port
5 km
Sea of Azov
UKRAINE
AssessedRussianadvances*
AssessedRussian-controlled
Mariupol,Marchrd
*Russiaoperatedinorattacked,butdoesnotcontrol
Sources:InstitutefortheStudyofWar;
AEI’s CriticalThreatsProject
Claimed Russian-
controlled
The massacres in Mariupol
In Mariupol, strategically situated
between Donbas and Crimea, the intensity
of Russian bombardment increased.
Ukrainian forces rejected a demand for
their surrender, but apparently now hold
only part of the city.
the pressure. A cost the Russians do not
talk about is their mounting death toll. Ac
cording to a nato estimate, 7,00015,
Russians have died; the organisation puts
the total number of those dead, injured
and captured at around 40,000. If casual
ties are indeed in that sort of range then al
most a quarter of the original invasion
force is out of action.
But the Ukrainians are not sure that the
Russian negotiators know how bad the sit
uation is. The team is “second tier”, accord
ing to an intelligence official in Kyiv; Mr
Kuleba says they do not appear empowered
to resolve issues such as the nature of the
security guarantees Ukraine wants.
Mr Putin’s failure to provide better ne
gotiators could well reflect a lack of inter
est in seeing the negotiations bear fruit,
perhaps because he thinks time is on his
side. Though many Russian advances have
stalled, there are quite a few places where it
could increase its bombardments. A secu
rity official in Kyiv says that Ukrainian in
telligence has had several warnings that a
massive, sustained rocket attack on the
capital is imminent. For unknown rea
sons, no such attack has materialised. But
it remains a possibility. And Ukraine does
not yet have the resources for decisive
counterattacks.
Yet Mr Putin has been wrong about this
war before. He may be again. Ms Rudik, the
mp, says time is of the essence. She just
doesn’t know who it favours. “The Russian
economy is collapsing but we are dying.
The question is who falls first.” n
Russia’s reactionary turn
The cult of war
O
n march 22nd, in a penal colony
1,000km northeast of the front lines
around Kyiv, Alexei Navalny, the jailed
leader of Russia’s opposition, was sen
tenced to another nine years imprison
ment. To serve them he will probably be
moved from Vladimir, where he has been
kept for more than a year, to a yet harsher
maximumsecurity jail elsewhere.
The crime for which he was sentenced
is fraud. His true crime is one of common
enterprise with that for which the people
of Ukraine are now suffering collective
punishment. The Ukrainians want to em
brace many, if not all, the values held dear
by other European nations. Mr Navalny
wants the same for Russia. Vladimir Putin
cannot countenance either desire. As Dmy
tro Kuleba, Ukraine’s foreign minister, told
The Economist, “If Russia wins, there will be
no Ukraine; if Ukraine wins, there will be a
new Russia.” That new Russia is as much a
target of Mr Putin’s war as Ukraine is. Its
potential must be crushed as surely as Mr
Navalny’s.
This crusade against a liberal European
future is being fought in the name of Russ-
kiy mir—“the Russian world”, a previously
obscure historical term for a Slavic civilisa
tion based on shared ethnicity, religion
and heritage. The Putin regime has re
vived, promulgated and debased this idea
into an obscurantist antiWestern mixture
of Orthodox dogma, nationalism, conspir
acy theory and securitystate Stalinism.
The war is the latest and most striking
manifestation of this revanchist ideologi
cal movement. And it has brought to the
fore a dark and mystical component with
in it, one a bit in love with death. As Andrei
Kurilkin, a publisher, puts it, “The sub
stance of the myth is less important than
its sacred nature...The legitimacy of the
state is now grounded not in its public
good, but in a quasireligious cult.”
The cult was on proud display at Mr Pu
tin’s first public appearance since the inva
sion—a rally at the Luzhniki stadium
packed with 95,000 flagwaving people,
mostly young, some bused in, many, pre
sumably, there of their own volition. An
open octagonal structure set up in the mid
dle of the stadium served as an altar. Stand
ing at it Mr Putin praised Russia’s army
A set of beliefs which once looked like a sideshow is now centre stage