The Economist - UK (2022-03-26)

The Economist March 26th 2022 53

China

Chinesepolitics

Xi’s stormy year

N

o date hasbeen set for it yet, not even

a month. But for every official, the or­

ders  are  clear.  Their  work  must  focus  on

making sure that a crucial Communist Par­

ty congress, to be held in the second half of

the  year,  goes  smoothly.  The  conclave  is

widely  expected  to  herald  the  start  of  at

least  another  five  years  of  rule  for  Xi  Jin­

ping. From the police to economic policy­

makers,  all  are  trying  to  minimise  unto­

ward  events  that  might  overshadow  his

moment of political glory. “The word ‘sta­

bility’ is the key,” leaders intone about the

coming year at official gatherings.

It  will  be  a  far  bumpier  ride  than  they

would  like.  In  recent  weeks  the  rapid

spread of Omicron, a highly transmissible

variant  of  the  virus  that  causes  covid­19,

has  posed  an  unprecedented  challenge  to

China’s much­vaunted “zero­covid” policy.

Widespread  lockdowns  have  added  to  the

wobbles of an already shaky economy. Just

this  month  Mr  Xi  contrasted  the  party’s

rule  with  “Western  chaos”.  He  was  refer­

ring, in part, to China’s two years of success

(after a botched initial response) at crush­

ing  covid.  If  officials  relax  the  policy  to

protect  the  economy  they  would  risk  a

surge  of  cases  that  could  overwhelm  Chi­

na’s fragile public­health system. 

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is another

severe  headache.  The  war  began  less  than

three  weeks  after  Mr  Xi  and  his  Russian

counterpart, Vladimir Putin, signed a joint

statement  in  February  declaring  “no  lim­

its”  to  the  two  countries’  friendship.  Chi­

nese  diplomats  are  now  struggling  to  bal­

ance  a  desire  to  preserve  what  they  see  as

this  crucial  relationship  against  a  risk  of

even  greater  tension  between  China  and

the  West,  which  could  compound  China’s

economic difficulties. 

Public  opinion  is  hard  to  gauge,  but

there  is  little  sign  that  the  party’s  policies

on  covid,  Ukraine  or  the  economy  are

widely  resented.  Many  Chinese  express

support for the tough zero­covid approach.

On  social  media,  however,  some  grum­

blingcirculates—despite  censors’  efforts

to  stifle  it.  Even  in  the  state­controlled

press  there  have  been  occasional  hints  of

disagreement  over  the  party’s  economic

strategy, which last year included a regula­

tory clampdown on tech firms and a call by

Mr Xi for “common prosperity” that scared

entrepreneurs by raising the spectre of big

redistributive  schemes.  Intriguingly,  the

prime  minister,  Li  Keqiang,  mentioned

common prosperity only once in his state­

of­the­nation speech to the national legis­

lature on March 5th. 

Among  China­watchers,  there  is  much

speculation about the extent of opposition

to Mr Xi within the elite, and the impact it

might have on his political grip. But there

is  no  convincing  evidence  that  his  plans

could  be  derailed  for  the  party  congress

and  a  meeting  immediately  afterwards  of

the  Central  Committee,  which  will  an­

nounce  the  leadership  line­up  (including

his own likely appointment to a third term

as party chief, violating recent norms). In­

deed, history suggests that for all the par­

ty’s  preoccupation  with  stability  in  the

build­up  to  party  congresses,  which  nor­

mally  are  held  every  five  years,  the  power

of  paramount  leaders  can  survive  enor­

mous buffeting. 

Mao  Zedong,  for  example,  ruled  China

for  nearly  27  years,  despite  the  deaths  of

In a crucial political year, Xi Jinping wants stability. He won’t get it

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56 Chaguan: Why China backs Russia