58 International The Economist March 26th 2022
tance to cross its territory. Facing the threat
that Russia, its oldest foe, could be on its
border, it is keen to reconcile with the eu.
That could spur the ruling Law and Justice
party to temper its judgenobbling and
pressstifling. But the opposite is also pos
sible. Poland’s Western partners may over
look abuses because of the essential role it
is playing over Ukraine. “It would be very
odd to be pressuring the Polish govern
ment on the rule of law right now,” says an
analyst close to the Biden administration.
“But Warsaw should understand that
countering autocrats requires strengthen
ing our own democracy.”
For their part, critics fear that Law and
Justice will use the spectre of further Rus
sian aggression to wrap itself in the flag,
tighten its grip over Polish institutions,
and step up attacks against “enemies”
within, such as liberals, feminists and gay
people. “Perhaps we need to change our ap
proach even more thoroughly,” a presenter
on Polish state tvrecently mused. “Can a
frontline state allow itself to tolerate at
tacks on its system of values?”
The war has caused energy prices to
soar, prompting the West to reconsider its
relations with autocratic petrostates. (Of
the 13 members of opec, a club of oil ex
porters, 11 are rated “not free” by Freedom
House, an American watchdog; two are rat
ed “partly free”.) Unlike his predecessor,
Mr Biden has infuriated Gulf rulers by
stressing human rights. He once promised
to make the Saudi regime “the pariah that
they are”. Now he is asking it to pump more
oil—a message reinforced by Boris John
son, Britain’s prime minister, who visited
Riyadh on March 16th. Mr Biden may have
to go further to make nice with Muham
mad bin Salman, the Saudi crown prince,
whom he has accused of ordering the dis
memberment of a Washington Postcolum
nist in 2018. The prince is cosying up to
China to demonstrate he has options. He is
considering pricing oil sales to China in
yuan instead of dollars, the Wall Street Jour-
nalreports. The prince wants more help
with his illfated war in Yemen and immu
nity from prosecution in America.
Another oilfuelled autocracy, Venezu
ela, hopes the war in Ukraine will help it
escape an embargo. Many democracies re
fuse to recognise Nicolás Maduro, an elec
tionrigging despot, as president. Mr Putin
has propped up Mr Maduro with plane
loads of weapons and cash, plus some
troops, largely to show he can meddle in
America’s backyard. But now everyone’s
calculations are changing.
Mr Maduro can no longer count on Mr
Putin, who is cashstrapped and far more
concerned about conquering Kyiv than
coddling Caracas. Mr Biden cares more
about stopping Mr Putin than unseating
Mr Maduro. Hence the extraordinary scene
on Venezuelan television on March 7th,
when Mr Maduro described meeting a
White House delegation two days before.
“The two flags looked beautiful,” he
gushed, “united, as the flags of the United
States and Venezuela should be”.
The Biden administration says the
main aim of the visit was humanitarian.
Mr Maduro released two imprisoned
Americans. He also promised to return to
talks he abandoned last year with the
muchpersecuted Venezuelan opposition.
But the two sides talked about oil, too. The
delegation to Caracas reportedly made any
sanctions relief contingent on Venezuela
exporting some oil to the United States.
Both sides are wary. But a limited rap
prochement seems possible, and would
surely strengthen Mr Maduro’s grip on
power. His meeting with American offi
cials was “de facto recognition” that he is
in charge, says Temir Porras, a former chief
of staff to Mr Maduro. The strongman has
“got something that he always wanted”. Re
publicans accuse Mr Biden of showing
weakness by reaching out to despots. Mar
co Rubio, a senator from Florida, said that
the meeting “did tremendous damage” to
the opposition.
Sympathy for the devils
Democracies have a long history of deals
with nasty regimes. Some were plainly
necessary. To defeat Nazi Germany the
West worked with Josef Stalin, prompting
Winston Churchill to remark: “If Hitler in
vaded Hell, I would make at least a favour
able reference of the Devil in the House of
Commons.” Others seem shameful. Ameri
ca’s coldwar support for anticommunist
kleptocrats in strategically peripheral plac
es, such as Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire (now
Congo), finds few defenders today.
The struggle against Mr Putin will force
the West to reconsider many of its ties with
lesser malefactors. But the new cold war is
different from the old one. Communism
was a universal ideology that inspired rev
olutions in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
Putinism is a howl of nationalist and reac
tionary rage. Neither Russia nor China of
fers “a compelling worldview capable of at
tracting mass popular support worldwide”,
notes Stewart Patrick of America’s Council
on Foreign Relations. This makes them
less of an existential threat to the free
world than the Soviet Union was, and so re
duces the incentive, or rationale, for mak
ing bargains as distasteful as those made to
keep communism at bay.
As sanctions crush Russia’s economy,
the Kremlin’s support for its own autocrat
ic clients may wither. Strongmen in Mali
and the Central African Republic may sur
vive, since the Russian mercenary opera
tions that protect them appear to be selffi
nancing. (The carhas a lot of diamonds.)
But Bashar alAssad in Syria and Alexander
Lukashenko in Belarus may be wobblier.
Mr Putin has saved both tyrants in the past,
sending troops to crush Syrian rebels in
2015, and goons to help Mr Lukashenko put
down protests against a stolen election in
2020. Both men are keen to keep Mr Putin
in their corner. Mr Assad, who is seeking to
end his isolation from his fellow Arabs (see
Middle East and African section), is said to
have sent Syrian “volunteers” to help Rus
sia in Ukraine.
Mr Lukashenko helped Mr Putin by let
ting Russia launch its southwards push for
Kyiv from Belarusian soil. Belarusian
troops were supposed to join in, but the
Belarusian opposition says they are reluc
tant to follow orders from an unpopular
despot to attack blameless fellow Slavs.
Belarusian rail workers have reportedly
sabotaged rail links with Ukraine to stop
supplies from reaching the invaders.
So far, the war itself is demonstrating
some of democracy’s strengths and auto
cracy’s drawbacks. Ukraine’s fighters have
astonished their adversaries, and its peo
ple’s commitment to their freedom has in
spired the world. For his part, Mr Putin was
able to start his ruinous war on a whim. His
flunkeys are scared to bring him unwel
come news. He seems sincerely to have ex
pected many Ukrainians to welcome his
troops. And his regime, like most autocra
cies, is corrupt, rendering his army weaker
in the field than on paper. Budgets have
been looted; Russian kit is breaking down
for lack of maintenance or spare parts.
Yet the result of the war is unpredict
able, and so too will be its effect on global
democracy. If Mr Putin achieves some
thing resembling a victory, that could in
spire strongmen everywhere. If he loses,
that could inspire those who stand up to
them. When Mr Biden reconvenes his de
mocracy summit later this year, much will
depend on the courageofUkrainians, and
the support they receivefrom democra
cies, with all their flaws.n