24 Britain The Economist April 2nd 2022
PandemicprocurementWhen waste is
worth it
S
toring tens of billions of surgical
masks,gownsandglovesisexpensive,
itturnsout.Bytheendof 2021 thegovern
menthadspentabout£737m($967m)for
theprivilegeofowningunusedpersonal
protective equipment (ppe) bought in a
panic during the pandemic. Although
£301mof this was normal storage fees,
suchasrentingwarehouses,themajority
wasfines.Itrackedup£436minthelogis
ticsequivalentofparkingtickets—charges
forleavinggoodsinshippingcontainers
becauseit hadnowheretoputthem.
AreportpublishedonMarch30thby
the National Audit Office, an official
spendingwatchdog,intothegovernment’s
purchaseofppeduringthecrisisislittered
with such horrors. A buying frenzy in
spring2020,asthepandemicletrip,sawit
spendabout£13bnon38bnpiecesofppe.
ByJuly,thehealthdepartmentrealisedit
hadpurchasedfarmorethanitcouldpos
siblyuse.About14bn items remain un
openedinshippingcontainersandware
houses.Around1.5bnofthemarelikelyto
passtheirexpirydatesoonandtoendupin
thebin.Nearly4bnwereneverfitforfront
lineuseinthefirstplace,ata costofrough
ly£3bn.Thatisanawfullotofwaste,both
physicalandfiscal.
Somistakeswereundeniablymade,but
somewereworthmaking.Atthestartof
thepandemic,thegovernmenthadtotake
risks. Countries were fighting over ppe
supplies.“WehadTrumpsendingthecia
roundtryingtogazumpeverybodyonppe,”recalled Dominic Cummings, a former
aide to the prime minister, before a parlia
mentary committee in 2021. Meanwhile,
nhs staff were reduced to wearing bin
bags. The price of a surgical gown shot up
from £0.33 before the pandemic to £4.50 in
the middle of it. In short, all was chaos.
The government abandoned caution in
response. Usual spending rules were set
aside. Officials buying ppe were exempted
from usual procurement rules, with the
aim of speeding up the process and avoid
ing them being outbid by foreign spooks.
Due diligence was sometimes replaced by a
quick Google, and some suppliers were
paid upfront. Predictably, on occasion
nothing was received in return. Some ppe
was substandard. About 20% of all orders
were expected to be unusable. In the end,
the figure was only 11%.
In normal times, the government’s pro
blem with risk is aversion rather than ad
diction. Civil servants can be overcautious,
moving slowly to avoid wasting money or
having a decision reversed by a judge. Usu
ally, this instinct is healthy. A business can
move fast and break things; a government
should not. Reversing this principle in the
pandemic made sense, despite the some
times poor results, which were entirely
predictable. Business as usual would have
meant less money wasted. But it would al
so have meant less ppeavailable, argue the
government’s defenders, and potentially
more nhsstaff dying.
Some mistakes cannot be forgiven so
readily, however. The government set up
a “viplane” along which suppliers known
to ministers or officials were fasttracked.
Chancers claiming to have access to ppe
were splashed across newspapers and then
put before ministers, who were desperate
both for supply and to avoid negative head
lines. “Most of them were full of shit,” says
one person involved. It looked like crony
capitalism and a court later said the
scheme was unlawful. Perhaps worse, it
was ineffective. Equipment bought
through the usual channels turned out less
likely to be defective and more likely to ar
rive on time. By contrast, the nao esti
mates that a third of spending through the
viplane, or roughly £1.4bn, is “at risk”.
Memories of the chaos of 2020 are al
ready fading. Labour has attacked the Con
servatives over wasteful spending in this
period. At the time, however, the govern
ment was waging a war against a new and
terrifying illness, with the state balance
sheet as a weapon. Gloves and gowns were
a fraction of the £400bn bill for surviving
the pandemic. Inevitably not all of it was
spent well. John Maynard Keynes summed
up a similar situation when describing the
British government’s decision to trash its
finances to fight thesecond world war: “We
threw good housekeepingto the wind, but
we saved ourselves.” nThe government made mistakes when
sourcing ppe—not all of them badOverpriced—and essentialMaternitycareBirthing pains
O
ne babydied at 21 minutes of age; an
other, at 34. A third made it to six
hours, and a fourth to six days. The skull of
one baby was crushed. The skull of anoth
er, after nine attempts at delivery, at times
with forceps, was fractured on both sides.
The final Ockenden Report, published
on March 30th after years of campaigning
by bereaved parents (two are pictured),
does not make for easy reading. It looks at
the maternity care provided by Shrewsbury
and Telford Hospital nhs Trust over two
decades. Its 250 pages are unprecedented
in nhs history, in length and scale—and,
arguably, in condemnatory tone. Although
finely detailed—noting the strength of this
mother’s contractions; when that mother’s
waters broke; when this baby ceased
breathing—its chief finding is simple. This
report, writes Donna Ockenden, the mid
wife who led it, “is about an nhs maternity
service that failed”.
Those failures came in many forms, ov
er many years. Ms Ockenden and a team of
midwives and doctors looked at the mater
nity care provided to 1,486 families, chiefly
between 2000 and 2019. They found that 131
stillbirths, 70 neonatal deaths and nine
maternal deaths might have been avoided,
had care been better. A police investigation
has been under way for some time. The
trust often failed to investigate serious in
cidents, sometimes even when a patient
died. When complaints were responded to,
those responses “often lacked compas
sion” and at times “implied that the wom
an herself was to blame”. An unprecedented report castigates the
failings of an nhstrust