The Economist April 2nd 2022 UnitedStates 37ThedefencebudgetRhetoric v reality
B
yinvadingukraine, VladimirPutin
has revitalised the world’s democracies
and strengthened nato’s resolve, Presi
dent Joe Biden told an audience in Warsaw
on March 26th. Two days later he submit
ted a budget to Congress that included
$813bn in defence spending. He called it
“one of the largest investments in our na
tional security in history”.
The administration’s numbers may not
match its rhetoric. America’s defence bud
get accounts for a whopping 40% of global
military expenditures. But the proposed
additional spending of $17bn above the to
tal of $796bn expected this year represents
an increase of only 2%.
That is lower than the budget’s project
ed rate of inflation of about 2.5%, which
some economists think is optimistic, giv
en the pace of price rises so far this year.
The administration prefers to highlight the
4% increase in the base budget for the De
partment of Defence. The department’s
budget excludes such things as spending
on nuclear warheads by the Department of
Energy, and supplemental outlays (for ex
ample, to help Ukraine and resettle Af
ghans who worked with America).
“This is going to be a realterms cut in
defence spending,” says Todd Harrison of
the Centre for Strategic and International
Studies, a thinktank in Washington, dc.
He predicts that Congress, which can mod
ify the president’s request, will add a hefty
slice of extra spending—perhaps another
$30bn—just as it did for the current year.
“The politics on the defence budget have
really changed substantially in the pasttwo months. A year ago, we were hearing
progressives in the Democratic Party talk
about trying to cut the defence budget by
10%. Those calls have gone silent.”
As a share of gdp, defence spending has
in fact fallen over the years, from 4.7% in
2010 to about 3.2% this year. The navy’s
fleet is set to shrink. And a nuclearcapable
sealaunched cruise missile is being can
celled. Leading Republicans have called for
a budget that adds 5% above inflation. If, as
seems likely, they take control of one or
both houses of Congress in this year’s mid
term elections, they will have the clout to
push for bigger increases.
The president’s request is something of
a muddle. Although issued late, it does not
take account of money that Congress re
cently agreed to spend, not least on Uk
raine. Officials acknowledge that it may
have to be reviewed later in the year. What
is more, the request was not preceded, aswas expected, by the publication of a na
tionalsecurity strategy.
Officials insist that the war in Ukraine
has not changed their underlying analysis:
Russia presents an acute menace and Chi
na is the longerterm challenge. Over the
years the breakdown of spending has shift
ed from the army to the navy and especially
the air force—a trend that continues in the
president’s request—to strengthen the lat
ter two in Asia in particular.
And a growing share, an extra 9.5%, has
gone to “research, development, test, and
evaluation”, not least in artificial intelli
gence. This helps to maintain America’s
military edge in the long term, but gener
ates little new capability in the meantime.
That suggests the administration does not
think it will be at war with China soon, de
spite the warnings of somecommanders
that China could try toinvadeTaiwan be
fore the end of the decade.nWASHINGTON, DC
A sense of strategy is missing from
Joe Biden’s defence-spending proposalI
n the monthsinceRussiainvaded
Ukraine, Joe Biden has called Vladimir
Putin a “war criminal” and a “butcher”.
New polling from YouGov/The Economist
suggests that younger Americans are far
more equivocal in their views on Russia
and the war.
Among some 1,500 people polled
between March 19th and 22nd, 73% said
they sympathise more with Ukraine than
with Russia. Yet this disguises a big
generational gap. Whereas 92% of those
aged 65 and over said they sympathise
more with Ukraine, just 56% of those
aged 1829 did—a difference of 36 per
centage points.
Younger Americans are also less
bothered about the war’s outcome: barely
half of those under 30 said they care who
wins, compared with 90% of those over65. And although Antony Blinken, Amer
ica’s secretary of state, has formally
declared that Mr Putin is deliberately
targeting civilians, younger Americans
are not so sure. Just 47% of under30s
said Russia was targeting civilians in
tentionally. In contrast, 91% of older
Americans agree with Mr Blinken.
YouGov/The Economistalso conducted
polls in France and Britain during the
fourth week of March, and there, too, a
generational gap exists—though a small
er one. What might explain it?
One possible reason is that, on aver
age, younger people tend to be less en
gaged in politics. Younger people who
said they were interested in politics were
moresympathetictoUkrainethantheir
lessengagedpeers.Butthegapbetween
wellinformedolderAmericansand
wellinformedyoungerAmericansisstill
wide,at 28 points,sothatcanbeonly
partofthestory.
Perhapsthewarseemsdistantto
youngAmericansdisillusionedbyfar
awayconflictsinAfghanistanandIraq.
HistoricalfearsofRussiamayplaya role,
too.Americans 65 andoldercameofage
duringthecoldwar.Thoseagedunder 30
werebornafter1992,whentheSoviet
Unionhadcollapsed.Yesteryear’sexperi
encemaystillcolourtoday’sviews.OurpollonthewarOlder andwiser?
Views on the war reveal astrikinggenerationaldivideThe age of reasoning
United States, Mar 19th-22nd 2022, % respondingSource:YouGov/TheEconomist65+0 25 50 75 100“ Who do you sympathise with more?”18-2 Ukraine Neither/unsureRussia18-2
65+“Do you think Russia is deliberately targeting
civilians in Ukraine?”
Ye s Not sure N o18-2
65+“Do you care who wins?”
Ye s Not sure No