54 International The Economist April 9th 2022
Like all mercenary outfits in Russia, the
Wagner Group does not officially exist, be
cause Russian law does not permit merce
nary activities. Yet in 2018 Mr Putin ac
knowledged its existence, suggesting its
work was fine provided it took place out
side Russia’s borders. “They have every
right to work and promote their business
interests anywhere in the world,” he said.
Small wonder that Russia’s authorities
have shown little interest in holding Wag
ner forces accountable for their behaviour,
including the torture in Syria.
Some 10,000 men are believed to have
served with Wagner since its inception,
most of them former Russian soldiers with
combat experience. Recruiters are said to
prefer those with specialised military
skills and without criminal records. The
work is well paid: mercenaries in Africa re
ceive as much as $4,000 per month.
Though Wagner mercenaries have been
dispatched on missions that served Rus
sia’s geopolitical interests, the organisa
tion has also made plenty of money along
the way. In most places Wagner operates,
such as Mali or car, it is paid by the local
government.Sometimes the deal is sweet
ened with control of gold or diamond
mines granted to Wagner or to companies
linked to the group’s main backer, Yevgeny
Prigozhin. In Syria Mr Prigozhin was cut
into oilfields; in Mali Wagner is reportedly
pocketing $10m a month.
At times, Mr Prigozhin appears to have
had tensions with some Russian officials,
such as the defence minister, Sergei Shoi
gu. In 2018 American air strikes killed
about 200 Russian mercenaries who at
tacked an Americanbacked Kurdish out
post near Deir alZour in eastern Syria;
Russia’s regular army reportedly did little
to avert the slaughter. Yet Wagner seems to
have recovered from such setbacks, per
haps thanks to Mr Prigozhin’s connections
in the Kremlin.
Mr Prigozhin served time in a Soviet
prison as a young man, and upon his re
lease he opened a hotdog stand in St
Petersburg. From that humble start he di
versified into restaurants that drew the
city’s elite. After Mr Putin became presi
dent in 2000, he began bringing highpo
wered guests to Mr Prigozhin’s establish
ments; President George W. Bush reported
ly dined on duckliver pâté, black caviar
and steak with morel mushrooms at New
Island, a Prigozhinowned restaurant
floating in the Neva river. Juicier contracts
for Mr Prigozhin to feed the armed forces
soon followed. He was later entrusted with
more serious missions, including the mer
cenary group that became Wagner and the
internet “troll farm”, the Internet Research
Agency, that was indicted by Robert Muell
er, a special prosecutor, for spreading dis
information online to interfere with the
American presidential election in 2016. For all its lucrative business, Wagner’s
record is mixed. It served Mr Putin’s pur
poses in the Donbas in 2014 and after. And
in Syria, Wagner mercenaries are believed
to have played a key role in recapturing the
city of Palmyra from Islamic State and in
helping Russia’s armed forces to keep
Bashar alAssad in power. But in 2019,
when Wagner was hired to fight jihadists
in northern Mozambique, its fighters beat
a rapid retreat after at least seven of them
were killed. In Libya about 1,000 Russian
mercenaries have fought for Khalifa Haf
tar, a rebel general, against the unrecog
nised government. They have not over
thrown the government and have been ac
cused of war crimes, including murdering
civilians. In car, about 2,000 Wagner mer
cenaries are propping up President Faus
tinArchange Touadéra, but are far from
vanquishing the rebels out to topple him.
In the past six months about 1,000 Wag
ner operatives have arrived in Mali. They
have already been accused, in a unreport,
of taking part with Malian soldiers in
trussing up about 30 people, dousing them
in petrol and burning them alive. Human
Rights Watch, a pressure group, says Rus
sian mercenaries with Malian forces sum
marily executed some 300 suspected Is
lamist fighters, an incident it calls “the
worst single atrocity reported in Mali’s de
cadelong armed conflict.” Meanwhile, ji
hadists continueto advance. Mission creeps
Reports of Wagner’s arrival in Ukraine ap
peared just days after the invasion.
Ukraine’s security services announced that
mercenaries had been dispatched to assas
sinate Volodymyr Zelensky, the president,
and other officials. Yet there has been no
independent confirmation of that, and an
alysts and journalists who track the group
reckon their use for such a sensitive mis
sion is improbable. Mercenaries do not appear to be fighting beside the Russian sol
diers who invaded from Russia, Belarus
and Crimea. Ukraine hasreleased informa
tion about only two fighters with Wagner
connections among the many Russians
taken prisoner; those men said they fought
with the group in the past, but came to Uk
raine with the regular Russian army.
Instead, mercenaries are reportedly
moving into the parts of Donetsk and Lu
hansk that were already occupied, to rein
force separatists trying to break through
Ukrainian lines. On March 28th the British
Ministry of Defence said it expected Wag
ner to deploy more than 1,000 mercenaries
in eastern Ukraine, including senior lead
ers. So far, those heading to Ukraine do not
appear to be from the core group. “They’re
using the old Wagner infrastructure—the
base, the recruiting channels,” says Ilya Ba
rabanov, a Russian journalist who has re
ported extensively on the group. “But it’s
not what we’re used to calling ‘Wagner’.”
Ukraine’s military intelligence says the
mercenaries are a new incarnation of Wag
ner called “Liga”, Russian for “league”. They
are being offered more than 200,000 rou
bles ($2,367) per month, several times
more than regular soldiers typically get.
Russia may also be turning to Syrians
and others who once fought beside Wag
ner. Mr Shoigu, the Russian defence minis
ter, claimed to Mr Putin that 16,000 “volun
teers” from the Middle East were ready to
fight in Ukraine. Videos from car also
show armed African men declaring they
want to fight for Russia. Though there is
little evidence of more than a trickle to Uk
raine so far, foreign fighters might add
more bulk than mercenaries alone. Yet
they may not prove particularly motivated.
Many would probably be “pressganged”
into it, as they were when Russia sent Syri
ans to back Mr Haftar’s failed push in Lib
ya, argues Ms Marten. During a decade of
civil conflict, Syrian soldiers showed more
aptitude for stealing household appliances
and selling drugs than fighting.
Western intelligence suggests some
Wagner mercenaries may be leaving Libya
for Ukraine. Perhaps even a few are depart
ing from car. But for now the signs of rede
ployments are limited. “No one cancelled
the other commercial contracts,” Mr Bara
banov notes. Indeed, well after the war in
Ukraine began, Wagner sent more merce
naries to Mali, says a French military offi
cial. “We think that there will be no major
impact to deployments in Mali and car,”
he adds. Even if more Russian mercenaries
do arrive in Ukraine, their record suggests
they may contributeless to the momen
tum of the conflictthanto the lengthening
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