The Economist April 9th 2022 Finance & economics 67
China’seconomy
Looking in the
side-mirror
O
micronmovesfast.Thatmakesitdif
ficult to contain—even for China,
which tries to stomp promptly on any out
break. A cluster of infections in Shanghai,
for example, has forced the government to
impose a hurried lockdown for which it
seems woefully unprepared.
The variant’s speed also makes China’s
economic prospects unusually hard to
track. A lot can happen in the time between
a data point’s release and its reference per
iod. The most recent hard numbers on Chi
na’s economy refer to January and Febru
ary. Those (surprisingly good) figures look
dated, even quaint. For most of that time,
therewasnowarinEurope.And new co
vid19 cases in mainland China averaged
fewer than 200 per day, compared with the
23,107 reported on April 7th. Relying on of
ficial economic figures is like using a rear
view mirror to steer through a chicane.
For a more timely take on China’s econ
omy, some analysts are turning to less con
ventional indicators. Baidu, a search en
gine and mapping tool, provides a daily
mobility index, for instance. Over the week
to April 3rd, this was more than 48% below
its level a year ago. The index is best suited
to tracking movement between cities, says
Ting Lu of Nomura, a bank. To gauge the
hustle and bustle within cities, he uses
other indicators, such as subway trips. Ov
er the week ending April 2nd, the number
of metro journeys in eight big cities was
nearly 34% lower than a year ago. In Shang
hai, where many subway lines are now
closed, the number of trips was down by
93%, a worse drop than in early 2020.
The two numbers that worry Mr Lu
most track distribution services. In the
week ending April 1st, an index of express
deliveries by courier companies was nearly
27% below its level at a similar point last
year. Over the same period, an index of
road freightfell by 12.8%. The decline looks
especially stark because the measure was
rising briskly at the end of last year.
Unconventional measures are all the
more valuable in China because of doubts
about the official data. The strong figures
for January and February, for example, are
not only old but odd. They suggest that in
vestment in “fixed” assets, like infrastruc
ture, manufacturing facilities and proper
ty, grew by 12.2% in nominal terms, com
pared with a year earlier. But that is hard to
square with doubledigit declines in the
output of steel and cement. The recovery in
property investment also looks peculiar
alongside the fall in housing sales, starts
and land purchases. When some local gov
ernments said that they were double
checking their figures at the behest of the
National Bureau of Statistics (nbs) it be
came clear that the official statistics look
odd even to the official statisticians.
China’s highfrequency indicators
proved their worth in spring 2020. Econo
mists were timid at first in cutting their
growth forecasts. No one knew exactly
how the economy would react or what the
nbswould be prepared to report. Armed
with evidence from highfrequency data,
forecasters were eventually brave enough
to predict a gdpdecline in the first quarter
of 2020. Indeed, it shrank by 6.8%, accord
ing to even the official figures.
The timeliness of unconventional indi
cators makes them valuable in periods of
flux. Still, “there are many traps,” says Mr
Lu. Any short period can be distorted, say
by bad weather, or holidays. And annual
growth rates can be skewed by past idio
syncrasies. Moreover, what does a dramat
ic weekly decline in road freight mean for
quarterly gdpgrowth? It is impossible to
say with any precision. Many indicators al
so have only a short history. As a phdstu
dent, Mr Lu was trained in econometrics.
“But with only one or two years of data, if I
used the kind of techniques I learned at
school, people would laugh at me.”
To help avoid some of the traps, Mr Lu
and his team watch “a bunch of numbers”.
“If seven or eight out of ten indicators are
worsening, then we can be confident that
gdp growth is getting worse,” he says.
Right now, he thinks,“something must be
going very wrong.”n
H ONG KONG
The search for less dated data on
China’s quickly deteriorating economy
Couriers in a time of covid
BankinginIndia
A house united
O
utside india,the union of two enti
ties that share a banal acronym in their
name might seem an exercise in bureau
cracy. But in the case of the acquisition of
Housing Development Finance Corpora
tion (hdfc) by hdfcBank, announced on
April 4th, that appearance would be decep
tive. The size of the deal, at $60bn, is by far
the biggest in India—triple the value of the
next largest acquisition (Walmart’s pur
chase of Flipkart for $17bn in 2018). It is also
the fourthbiggest banking transaction in
the world ever, according to Refinitiv, a da
ta provider. The resulting entity is estimat
ed to have a market capitalisation of as
MUMBAI
A huge merger marks a milestone
for Indian finance
costs. Another explanation is the wealth, at
least on paper, that Americans have accu
mulated thanks to rising asset prices over
the past two years. About a quarter of exist
inghome sales are allcash transactions
now, compared with a fifth before the pan
demic, according to the National Associa
tion of Realtors.
Resistant to rising rates, though, does
not mean impervious. At some point high
borrowing costs will crimp demand. More
over, the fundamentals underpinning the
property rally—the limited supply of new
homes—may prove to be, in part, an arte
fact of the pandemic. Nearly 1.6m homes
are under construction nationwide, the
most since the early 1970s. The problem is
that the housing sector is, like other parts
of the economy, suffering from labour
shortages and gummedup supply chains.
It is taking longer than normal to complete
construction. A resolution of these con
straints could move America from a prop
erty shortage to a glut.
Ms Zelman is far from alone this time in
her warnings. On March 29th a group of re
searchers with the Dallas Fed noted that
their “exuberance indicator”, a gauge to de
tect housing bubbles, was flashing red.
“Our evidence points to abnormal ushous
ingmarket behaviour for the first time
since the boom of the early 2000s,” they
wrote. Few expect a repeat of the collapse
that followed that boom. Homeowners
have healthier balancesheets than they
did 15 years ago, and borrowing standards
are stricter. Nevertheless, the housing
market today provides just another illus
tration of the rocky path thattheFed must
navigate, with rampant inflation on one
side and abust on the other.n